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PREEMPTION, PATCHWORK IMMIGRATION 
LAWS, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR BROWN 
SUNDOWN TOWNS 
Maria Marulanda* 
 
The raging debate about comprehensive immigration reform is ripe 
ground to overhaul federal exclusivity in the immigration context and move 
toward a cooperative federal and state-local model.  The proliferation of 
immigration-related ordinances at the state and local level reflects 
“lawful” attempts to enforce immigration law to conserve limited resources 
for citizens and legal residents.  Although the federal immigration statutes 
contemplate state and local involvement, the broad federal preemption 
model used to analyze immigration laws displaces many state-local 
ordinances, resulting in frustration at the inability to enforce the 
community’s resolve that is manifested through violence against Latino 
immigrants.  Broad federal preemption analyses alter the traditional scope 
of the states’ police powers, and set the stage for “brown sundown 
towns”— where Latinos are not welcomed. 
This Note evaluates the preemption analyses used in Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton and Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, and looks at the 
aftermath effects of the decisions at the communal level.  It argues that the 
narrow preemption analysis in Chicanos Por La Causa strikes the correct 
balance between federal and state-local interests.  A narrow approach 
better weighs state-local concerns and generates notoriety, which can 
incentivize action at the federal level.  The Note then studies three 
scholarship models that balance differently the federal and state-local 
relationship in the immigration context.  It posits that the narrow 
preemption approach can pave the way for the cooperative federalism 
model, and contain a new wave of sundown towns.  As narrow preemption 
analysis considers state-local concerns, cooperative federalism addresses 
the reality that it is states and localities, rather than the federal 
government, which must incorporate immigrants into the communal fabric.  
Accordingly, this Note calls attention to the relationship between 
preemption analysis, practical reality at the state-local level, and how these 
two factors correlate with the creation of brown sundown towns. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law, B.A., 2004, Columbia 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Robin A. Lenhardt for her ideas and thoughtful 
guidance.  Gracias a mi mamá por su cariño, apoyo, y por siempre creer en mí.  Thanks 
especially to my husband for his love, constant encouragement, and faith in me throughout 
the Note process.  I would also like to thank my family and friends, particularly Liz for her 
support and Ryan for his insightful feedback. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“A Mass Meeting of the citizens of this place and vicinity will be held . . 
. to devise some lawful means of ridding Crescent City of Chinese.”1 
 
The idea that the federal government has plenary power over immigration 
law is beginning to erode.2  Grounded on a tenuous foundation,3 federal 
exclusivity over immigration should be revisited in light of increased state 
and local legislation seeking to fill in gaps in the complex and vague federal 
immigration policy.4  Currently, the state-local legislation affecting 
immigrants reflects “lawful” attempts to enforce immigration law at the 
local level as states and localities attempt to conserve limited resources for 
their citizens and legal residents.  Because of the broad federal preemption 
models generally applied to analyze immigration laws, the legislative text 
of these subnational laws seeks to mirror federal standards or evade 
categorization as immigration regulations, and seeks classification as 
permitted regulations within the state-local police powers—that is, the 
states’ ability to regulate health, welfare, and crime.5  This technical 
maneuvering approach is setting the stage for a new iteration of “sundown 
towns”—brown sundown towns, where Latinos are not welcomed. 
The current immigration landscape is ripe ground to reexamine federal 
exclusivity and move toward a cooperative federal and state-local model.6  
This new model, cooperative federalism, better addresses the reality that it 
is states and localities, rather than the federal government, that must be 
tasked with incorporating immigrants into the communal fabric.7  Allowing 
state and local laws to determine how best to deal with immigrant influxes 
may result, in the interim, in national confusion as to the correct preemption 
 
 1. JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS:  A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM 
310–311 (2006) (reprinting newspaper articles that document the Chinese expulsion from 
California). 
 2. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 571–76 (2008); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion:  The Rise of 
State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1566, 1581–83 (2008). 
 3. States regulated immigration until U.S. Supreme Court decisions established 
congressional plenary power in the immigration context. See Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 
255, 255 (referring to Congress’s plenary power over immigration law as a “constitutional 
oddity”); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 115–23 (5th ed. 2009) (suggesting that federal exclusivity in 
immigration policy is not explicitly grounded in the Constitution’s text). 
 4. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sub-national Immigration Regulation and the Pursuit 
of Cultural Cohesion, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1443–46 & nn.8–9 (2009); Peter Baker, 
Obama Exhorts Congress To Back Immigration Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, at A12; 
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006) (employment); id. § 1324 (harboring).  However, neither 
statutory provision is specific or clear enough for uniform judicial agreement regarding 
congressional intent whether to partially or entirely preempt state and local legislation in 
these areas. 
 5. See Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1566–67. 
 6. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 570–73, 641. 
 7. Id.  It is important to make the reality on the ground reflect the law on the books. Id. 
324 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
approach.8  This effect likely will be short lived.9  The diversity of 
approaches will incentivize the federal government to set clearer standards 
or take a stance in the current debate,10 which will foster federal-state 
cooperation and increase control and enforcement of immigration law.11  
Piecemeal state-local attempts within the current immigration framework 
only redirect immigrant flows elsewhere without finding practical solutions 
on how to integrate, manage, and stabilize immigrant influxes.  The 
cooperative federalism model will result in a greater degree of collaboration 
between the federal and state-local governments.  Combined with a narrow 
preemption analysis, this model will tackle the immigration problem head 
on and prevent the proliferation of brown sundown towns.12 
This Note evaluates the broad and narrow preemption analyses used in 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton13 and Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. 
Napolitano.14  It looks at the aftermath of the decisions at the communal 
level and posits that Chicanos Por La Causa strikes the correct balance 
between federal and state-local interests.  A narrow approach better weighs 
state-local concerns and generates notoriety, which can incentivize action at 
the federal level.  The Note also studies three scholarship models that 
balance differently the federal and state-local relationship in the 
immigration context and proposes that the narrow preemption approach can 
pave the way for the cooperative federalism model.  By better addressing 
the reality that states and localities—rather than the federal government—
must incorporate immigrants into the communal fabric, cooperative 
federalism can contain a new wave of sundown towns.  Accordingly, this 
Note calls attention to the relationship between preemption analysis, 
 
 8. Id. at 616–36; see also Gulasekaram, supra note 4, at 1496 (“Currently, the federal 
polity and several states and localities are construction zones.”). 
 9. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 616–36.  This approach will lead to some initial 
discrimination, but in the long run, competition at the subnational level is healthy in 
developing a coherent immigration approach. Id. 
 10. See id.; Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Law Is the Focus of a Debate in U.S. Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A18; Julia Preston, Justice Dept. Sues Arizona Over Its 
Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2010, at A3.  
 11. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 616–36. 
 12. See generally Tom I. Romero, II, No Brown Towns:  Anti–Immigrant Ordinances 
and Equality of Educational Opportunity for Latina/os, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 13 
(2008).  This article explores the impact of anti-immigration ordinances in the educational 
context, but it contains statistics on how the measures have affected the movement of 
Latinos. Id. at 15–16 (discussing how about “25,000 Latinos left northeastern Oklahoma 
alone in response to the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, ‘billed by 
its backers as the toughest U.S. legislation against illegal immigration’” (quoting Oklahoma 
Law Blamed For Hispanic Exodus, MSNBC (Jan. 25, 2008), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22845808/from/ET/)).  Professor Tom I. Romero argues that 
the state-local educational measures are about race—“about who is and who is not part of the 
community”—and not about the need for immigration control at the state-local level. Id. at 
15–17. 
 13. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, slip 
op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010). 
 14. 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), amended by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, ___ S. Ct. ___, 78 U.S.L.W. 3762 
(U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115). 
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practical reality at the state-local level, and how these two factors can 
combine to develop brown sundown towns. 
In Part I, this Note explores the case law, constitutional, statutory, and 
social foundations underlying the current immigration regulatory 
framework.  Part II of this Note lays out the two types of federal preemption 
analyses used to examine state-local laws of which immigrants are the 
subjects.  It then addresses three scholarship models proposing different 
balances to the federal and state-local relationship in the realm of 
immigration law.  In Part III, this Note argues that the narrow preemption 
analysis in Chicanos Por La Causa strikes the correct balance between 
federal and state-local interests.  It proposes that the narrow preemption 
approach will pave the way for the cooperative federalism model, and 
prevent a new wave of sundown towns. 
I. UNDERSTANDING SUNDOWN TOWNS, FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY IN 
IMMIGRATION, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
This part explains the legal history that shaped the current federal 
immigration regulatory scheme.  Part I.A defines “sundown towns” and 
describes why the concept is relevant to the current national debate over 
immigration regulation.  Then, Part I.B. traces the constitutional and case 
history that established federal exclusivity over immigration laws.  Part I.C 
concentrates on how the constitutional and case-law developments resulted 
in vast federal statutes governing immigration.  It then explains how 
subsequent statutes and case law have eroded the doctrine of federal 
exclusivity in the immigration context. 
A. Sundown Towns 
Sundown towns are an obscure part of American history.15  A sundown 
town refers to a jurisdiction that excluded minority groups from living 
there—it was “all-white” on purpose.16  Because such a classification was 
inappropriate for U.S. Census purposes,17 the towns usually allowed one 
black family or other racial minorities to reside within the jurisdictional 
boundaries.18 
Sundown towns emerged during the 1800s and reflected the growing 
anti-Chinese sentiment in response to increased immigration from China to 
the United States.19  Capitalists encouraged Chinese immigration as a cheap 
 
 15. LOEWEN, supra note 1, at 5. 
 16. Id. at 4. 
 17. Race has been asked about in the Census since 1790. Race:  Why Ask About It?, 
U.S. Census Bureau Question & Answer Center, https://ask.census.gov/ (last visited Sept. 
23, 2010) (insert “Race:  Why Ask About It?” into “Search by Keyword” and select first 
result).  The government uses the data to assess disparities in health, access to social 
services, and education, among other government benefits. Id.  The information also is 
important to determine funding for federal programs. Id. 
 18. LOEWEN, supra note 1, at 4. 
 19. Id. at 12, 31, 47. 
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source of farm, domestic, and industrial labor.20  Although Chinese 
immigrants were a vital part of building the American West,21 white 
workers suffered due to increased competition with the Chinese for the 
same sources of employment.22  As a result, state and local government 
efforts forced Chinese immigrants to migrate to large metropolitan cities, 
away from small towns and suburbs, thereby creating sundown towns.23 
Accordingly, many towns and counties in the West drove out their 
Chinese populations through a combination of legal and extra-legal 
methods usually characterized by violence.24  For example, armed white 
miners in Wyoming gave Chinese workers one hour to evacuate the town, 
after which they opened fire.25  Because some Chinese hid in their homes, 
the rioters set fire to their houses, killing those remaining inside.26  Those 
who escaped were not spared; without shelter, many died from exposure to 
low temperatures, leading to the expression “He doesn’t have a Chinaman’s 
chance.”27  This series of events was repeated throughout Western towns.28 
The sundown town concept grew to characterize not only the exclusion 
of the Chinese, but also African Americans and Mexicans.29  “In town after 
town in the United States, especially between 1890 and the 1930s, whites 
forced out their African American neighbors violently, as they had the 
Chinese in the West.”30  After African Americans gained their freedom, 
many American cities with black populations devised ways to exclude the 
new citizens.31  Through ordinances or other governmental action,32 
buyout,33 freeze-out,34 or violence,35 many cities became places where 
blacks and other ethnic minorities were not welcome.36  By the early 1900s, 
these towns explicitly forbade blacks and other ethnic minorities from 
 
 20. See id. at 50. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. at 18, 47, 50–54. 
 24. Id. at 50–53. 
 25. Id. at 50. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 51. 
 28. Id. at 50–53. 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id. at 92. 
 31. See id. at 90–114. 
 32. See id. at 99–105.  An ordinance is an authoritative law, decree, or regulation. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1132 (8th ed. 2004).  “Municipal governments can pass 
ordinances on matters that the state government allows to be regulated at the local level.” Id.  
Although the ordinances were eventually found to be illegal, their enforcement continued 
through the formal policy or unwritten laws of police departments. LOEWEN, supra note 1, at 
103–05. 
 33. LOEWEN, supra note 1, at 108–09.  Buyout refers to communal efforts in which 
towns bought out the homes of African Americans or prevented African Americans from 
completing purchases. Id. at 108. 
 34. Id. at 105–07.  Freeze-out refers to the practice employed by some towns in which 
white residents made African Americans feel unwelcome and barred African Americans 
from activities in which they had previously participated. Id. at 105–06.  This was achieved 
through collective but private discrimination. Id. at 107. 
 35. Id. at 92–99.  “Sometimes just the threat of violence sufficed . . . .” Id. at 96. 
 36. Id. at 90–114. 
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residing within their limits.37  If allowed at all, blacks and minorities had to 
leave town before sundown, and signs reading “Nigger, Don’t Let the Sun 
Go Down on You in _____[town name]” proliferated.38 
Cultural fears and violence played a powerful role in the creation of 
sundown towns.39  For example, Vienna, Illinois, became a sundown town 
in the 1950s after racial tensions erupted when two black men assaulted two 
white women.40  The entire black community became a proxy for the 
town’s outrage and many African Americans’ houses were set on fire.41  
Vienna’s black inhabitants ran for their lives, and as of the 2000 Census, 
there is only one African American resident.42  Similarly, when a black 
family tried to move into Cicero, Illinois, the police forcefully stopped 
them.43  The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) obtained an injunction to bar police interference, but this action 
resulted in communal anger directed at the black family, who decided not to 
move to the town.44  Whatever the method used, cities that resolved to 
exclude racial and ethnic minorities used the tools at their disposal—that is, 
their police powers to regulate property, zoning, and land use.45  Instances 
of violence reflected the communities’ frustration at being unable to 
determine which people became a part of the community and how they 
were integrated.46  The violence was a manifestation of extra-legal means to 
enforce the community’s resolve.47 
The state and local legislation that resulted in sundown towns was 
grounded on the states’ and localities’ police powers, and a tradition of 
uneven enforcement and intimidation schemes.48  The sundown town 
phenomenon spread due to the federal government’s protracted inability to 
produce a national housing law to curtail the existence and tolerance of 
sundown towns.49  It was not until the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 
(FHA) that states and localities were forced to rein in the use of their police 
powers to keep out or drive out ethnic minorities.50  The FHA prohibits 
 
 37. See id. at 3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 10–12. 
 40. Id. at 10. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 10–11. 
 44. Id. at 11. 
 45. See id. at 106–07.  This Note does not espouse the methods adopted by sundown 
towns or those being implemented by state and local governments in the current immigration 
debate.  It only emphasizes that the methods likely fall within the state and local 
governments’ police powers or, at the very least, illustrate the exploration of non-violent 
methods to implement the community’s legislative priorities. 
 46. See id.; Romero, supra note 12, at 15, 29–30. 
 47. See LOEWEN, supra note 1, at 107; cf. Romero, supra note 12, at 33. 
 48. See Romero, supra note 12, at 30–32 (discussing how anti-immigration legislation 
stems from factors that parallel the proliferation of sundown towns in the early 1900s). 
 49. Cf. LOEWEN, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 50. See id. at 130–32, 395–96 (detailing the federal government's and other 
governmental bodies' actions—or inaction—which contributed to the sundown town 
phenomenon). 
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public and private discrimination in the housing market on the basis of race, 
color, national origin, sex, religion, disability, and familial status.51 
However, despite the breadth of the federal intervention, the damage to 
race relations had been done.  States and localities searched for alternative 
ways to continue to exclude ethnic and racial minorities.52  Federal inaction 
resulted in the severe segregation of many American towns, a persisting 
socio-cultural effect.53 
The federal government's current inaction and its inability to effectively 
control immigration are increasing the possibility that the sundown town 
concept may soon expand to include all Latino immigrants.54  Therefore, it 
is important to understand the history of federal activity and its correlation 
to the sundown town phenomenon. 
B. History of Federal Exclusivity:  How Did We Get Here? 
Until the mid-nineteenth century there was virtually no immigration law 
in the United States.55  The movement of people across borders was 
perceived to fall within each state’s police powers,56 which refer to a state’s 
ability to legislate on health, welfare, and crime.57  During this still nascent 
stage in the country’s history, states were primarily concerned with 
excluding criminals and other “undesirables.”58 
In 1875, the U.S. Supreme Court began to curb the era of state control of 
immigration to address more effectively the large immigrant influx59 and 
the disparate state laws regulating immigrants.60  The Court’s decision in 
 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). 
 52. See Romero, supra note 12, at 32 (describing systematic enforcement of local land 
use laws to harass, discriminate against, and keep out racial minorities, while avoiding 
constitutional or FHA violations). 
 53. See LOEWEN, supra note 1, at 16. 
 54. See Romero, supra note 12, at 33 (“[A]nti-immigration ordinances and other 
similarly toned anti-immigrant legislation in many ways are the latest manifestation of the 
Sundown Town phenomenon.  Many of the catalysts driving anti-immigration hysteria are 
little different from those factors contributing to Sundown Town sentiment in the early 
twentieth century . . . .”). 
 55. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 115–20.  Except for the Alien and 
Sedition Act of 1798, Congress had not regulated immigration before 1875. Id. at 117 n.3.; 
Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1566–67. 
 56. Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1566–67. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1567–69.  Due to a variety of “pull factors” in the United States, such as the 
need for labor to build railroads, and “push factors” in China, such as war and political 
turmoil, there was a large influx of Chinese immigrants into the United States during the 
1850s. See id.; see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law 
(1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) (discussing the one hundred years of state 
forays into immigration regulation); cf. 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 2.02 (rev. ed. 1966); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 14–15.  
Accordingly, many of the early state forays into immigration regulation were racist in nature, 
directed at the large Asian immigrant influx. See Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1569–73. 
 59. See 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 58, § 2.02; LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, 
at 14–15.  Even so, the immigration rate remained high and from 1901 to 1910, more than 
8.5 million people came to the United States. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 23. 
 60. Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1571. 
2010] BROWN SUNDOWN TOWNS? 329 
Chy Lung v. Freeman61 started to establish federal plenary power in 
immigration law.62  Soon thereafter, in a string of cases dealing with 
congressional statutes regulating Chinese immigration to the United States, 
the Court developed and declared federal plenary power in the immigration 
context, and attempted to ground it in the constitutional text.63  The Court 
used various constitutional clauses to expand the federal government’s 
power over immigration.64 
Based on enumerated powers, the Court cited the Commerce Clause, 
which allows Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”65  It 
also tried to ground plenary power over immigration in the Migration or 
Importation Clause, which authorized Congress to prohibit migration and 
importation after 1808.66  The Naturalization Clause also was explored 
because it authorizes Congress to create “an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization” and thus implied that admission of noncitizens could be 
enveloped under the clause.67  The War Clause was considered as well, 
since it allowed Congress to regulate “alien enemies” and perhaps extended 
to regulation of noncitizens already in the country.68 
Ultimately, the Court relied on implied constitutional powers to shape the 
federal exclusivity doctrine in the immigration field.69  In Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),70 the Court determined that 
Congress had an absolute authority to exclude noncitizens, derived from its 
sovereign powers.71  Finally, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,72 the 
Supreme Court solidified its jurisprudence on congressional supremacy in 
the field of immigration.  The Court held that the federal government’s 
inherent sovereign powers extended to admission, exclusion, and 
 
 61. 92 U.S. 275 (1875). 
 62. Id. at 279–80 (implying that the Foreign Affairs and Commerce Clauses did not 
permit states to make immigration-related determinations because the states could embroil 
the United States in wars with other countries). 
 63. See Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1572. 
 64. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 
603–04 (1889) (holding that the government’s ability to exclude noncitizens derived from its 
sovereign powers); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 115–23 (reviewing the various 
constitutional clauses and other powers the Supreme Court used to ground immigration 
regulation solely in the federal government). 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I; § 8, cl. 3; see Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 
270–71 (1875) (using the Commerce Clause to strike down a state law requiring arriving 
vessels to pay taxes on arriving noncitizen passengers). 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 118. 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 
118–19. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 
119. 
 69. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 119–25. 
 70. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 71. Id. at 604 (“‘The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute.  It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.  Any 
restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its 
sovereignty . . . .’” (quoting The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 
136 (1812))). 
 72. 149 U.S. 698 (1893); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 147–55; 
Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1572. 
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deportation decisions, and that this power reposed only in the political 
branches and not the courts.73  With this decision, the Court stopped trying 
to link the constitutional text to the federal government’s absolute power 
over immigration.  Instead, it justified the federal exclusivity doctrine on 
the extra-constitutional concept of powers, which are “an inherent . . . right 
of every sovereign.”74  Framed as political decisions, Congress’s admission 
and exclusion policies became largely immune from judicial review.75  
Despite the judiciary’s application of the federal exclusivity doctrine in 
immigration, within the last thirty years, congressional action and case law 
have increasingly eroded the principle. 
C. Dismantling Federal Exclusivity:  Legislative and Judicial History 
Over a twenty-five year period, the Supreme Court pushed the states out 
of immigration regulation.76  The decisions led to myriad legislation 
regulating immigration into the United States,77 culminating with the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).78  Congress regularly 
amends the INA to reflect the most current immigration law.79  
Accordingly, throughout the twentieth century, the doctrine of federal 
exclusivity—plenary power—over immigration legislation was ingrained in 
American jurisprudence. 
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided De Canas v. Bica.80  The decision 
was crucial because it weakened the vast but vague federal exclusivity 
 
 73. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 704–05, 731. See generally Michael J. Wishnie, 
Laboratories of Bigotry?  Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and 
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001) (arguing that federal immigration authority 
cannot be devolved to the states).  This Note proffers that immigration regulation can be 
shared between the states and the federal government. 
 74. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711–13; see LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 
149–50; Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1572–73. 
 75. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731; LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 149–
50; Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1572–73. 
 76. In later cases, the Court further refined the field for the federal government by 
prohibiting the states from trying to regulate immigration through the criminal law. See 
Stumpf, supra note 2, at 1573–78. 
 77. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 14–22.  In 1917, Congress tried to control 
the quality of immigrants by looking at physical and moral characteristics and literacy levels. 
1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 58, § 2.02–2.04; LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 14–
22.  Then in 1921, Congress instituted a quota system based on the percentage of the white 
population in 1920 that could trace its ancestry to that country. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, 
supra note 3, at 14–22.  Three years later, the Immigration Act of 1924 established another 
quota system based on two percent of the foreign-born individuals of each nationality in the 
United States in 1890, and limited annual arrivals into the country to 150,000. Lozano v. 
City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 558 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 
07-3531, slip op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010).  In 1942, a shortage of American men, due 
to World War II deployments, led to the “bracero” program. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra 
note 3, at 377, 1141.  This program was established to bring Mexican workers to harvest 
fields; it ended in 1964. Id. 
 78. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 §§ 101–507, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 
(2006). 
 79. 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 58, §§ 2.03–2.04; LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 
3, at 17. 
 80. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
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doctrine in the immigration context.  In determining the constitutionality of 
a California statute that imposed penalties on employers who hired 
unauthorized immigrants, the Court stated that not all “state enactment[s] 
which in any way deal[] with aliens [are] regulation[s] of immigration.”81  
This statement indicates that there is room for the states to pass legislation 
that affects immigrants without encroaching on the federal government’s 
power to determine which immigrants to admit, exclude, or deport.82  In 
reaching its decision, the De Canas Court took a narrow preemption 
analysis, which contrasts with the more prevalent and broad preemption 
analysis performed in the immigration context.83  The broad preemption 
approach “leads courts to define conflict between state and federal laws 
broadly and to put a thumb on the scale in favor of preemption.”84  Scholars 
on both sides of the divide over immigration rely on De Canas to advance 
their propositions.85  Part I.D discusses the preemption doctrine and its 
application in the immigration context. 
After De Canas, Congress also began to cut away at the federal 
exclusivity doctrine.  The first legislation to do so was the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).86  The Act established an 
unprecedented system of document verification for immigrant employment 
in conjunction with criminal and civil penalties for violations of the Act.87  
IRCA introduced employment regulation of aliens into the immigration 
 
 81. Id. at 355.  Although the De Canas decision was before the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which marked the beginning of federal presence in the 
regulation of immigrant employment, the case continues to be used for its preemption 
analysis in the immigration context. See Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of 
State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 592–96 
(2009); Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 620–21; Stumpf, supra note 2. 
 82. See Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 620–21. 
 83. Id. at 621. 
 84. Id.  State and federal laws discriminating on the basis of alienage are subject to 
different levels of scrutiny. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86-87 (1976); Gulasekaram, 
supra note 4, at 1478-81; Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 628–29.  This Note only focuses on the 
preemption analysis approach to the current immigration situation; whether a state law 
ultimately survives judicial review for compliance with constitutional and federal rights is 
beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
 85. See infra Part II.C (discussing three scholarship models, their connection to De 
Canas, and their utility in understanding the immigration regulatory scheme); see also Kris 
W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law:  What States Can and Should Do To Reduce 
Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 462–66 (2008) (advancing that De Canas 
allows states to pass immigration legislation because it is within the states’ police powers). 
But see McKanders, supra note 81, at 590–92, 594 (positing that because De Canas was a 
pre–IRCA decision, IRCA displaces state involvement in employment legislation that affects 
immigrants). 
 86. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  This act is mostly known for its 
mass legalization scheme, which allowed eligible undocumented aliens to obtain legal status. 
8 U.S.C § 1255a (2006); see Aristide R. Zolberg, Reforming the Back Door:  The 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 in Historical Perspective, in IMMIGRATION 
RECONSIDERED:   HISTORY, SOCIOLOGY, AND POLITICS 334–35 (Yans-McLaughlin ed., 1990). 
 87. Zolberg, supra note 86, at 334.  The Act authorizes civil penalties of $250 to $2000 
for each worker violation and criminal penalties, including steep fines and terms of 
imprisonment, for a continued pattern of hiring unauthorized workers. Id. 
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area, further widening Congress’s role in this context.  IRCA prohibits 
employers from hiring unauthorized aliens,88 defined as aliens not “lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence” or “authorized to be so employed by 
[IRCA] or by the Attorney General.”89  The Act establishes procedures to 
enable employers to comply with IRCA’s requirements.  For example, to 
ensure that employers can determine a person’s immigration status, the 
statute lists the document types employers may accept to verify an 
employee’s eligibility to work in the United States.90  The Act requires 
employers to inspect and attest to the veracity of the employee’s 
documentation, and comply in good faith with the statute’s instructions.91  
It also details procedures employers must follow when they unknowingly 
hire unauthorized aliens or when employees become unauthorized 
subsequent to hiring.92  Both employers and employees are subject to civil 
fines or criminal penalties for document fraud during the employment 
process.93 
IRCA’s preemption and savings clauses are crucial to the current raging 
debate regarding state and local involvement in the context of the 
employment of aliens.  The clauses read:  “The provisions of this section 
preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other 
than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit 
or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”94  The section 
“other than through licensing and similar laws” is known as the savings 
clause.95  Accordingly, the savings clause contemplates state or local 
involvement in regulating the employment of aliens through legislative 
mechanisms within their police powers.  This brief statutory provision is the 
center of the current debate. 
Further immigration reforms were introduced in 1996 to refine the 
already vast and complex immigration scheme.  The Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)96 sought to 
tighten the federal immigration system.97  IIRIRA covers issues such as 
border patrol, document fraud, and public benefits eligibility.98  The Act’s 
 
 88. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A). 
 89. Id. § 1324a(h)(3). 
 90. See id. § 1324a(b); Rachel Feller, Preempting State E-Verify Regulations:  A Case 
Study of Arizona’s Improper Legislation in the Field of “Immigration-Related Employment 
Practices”, 84 WASH. L. REV. 289, 297–98 (2009). 
 91. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)–(2), (6). 
 92. See id. § 1324a(a)(2).  In both instances, the employer must discharge the employee. 
See id.; Jason P. Luther, A Tale of Two Cities:  Is Lozano v. City of Hazleton the Judicial 
Epilogue to the Story of Local Immigration Regulation in Beaufort County, South Carolina?, 
59 S.C. L. REV. 573, 579–80 (2008). 
 93. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(e), 1324c. 
 94. Id. § 1324a(h)(2). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996) (codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 
U.S.C.). 
 97. See Feller, supra note 90, at 297. 
 98. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 
Stat., at 3009–546 (increasing restrictions on immigration and reviewability of removal 
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provisions allow states to implement programs to filter out and deny 
undocumented aliens access to a driver’s license.99  The Act also allows the 
Attorney General “to deputize state and local authorities to enforce federal 
immigration law.”100  Importantly, the Act explicitly states that a written 
agreement with the Attorney General is not required for state or local 
officers to communicate with the Attorney General or otherwise cooperate 
with the enforcement of federal immigration laws.101  Thus, the Act 
contemplates state-local partnerships with the federal government in 
immigration control and enforcement. 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (PRWORA)102 also increased the opportunity for state involvement in 
the administration of laws affecting immigration.  The PRWORA permits 
states to make public benefits determinations based on immigration 
status103 and to “make independent determinations on the eligibility of legal 
resident aliens.”104  With the PRWORA, Congress sought to close gaps in 
the federal immigration scheme by ensuring that unauthorized aliens, 
usually the undocumented, could not benefit from public benefits at either 
the national or subnational level.105  In the Act, Congress explicitly includes 
numerous provisions to ensure that unauthorized aliens do not receive 
public benefits at the federal, state, or local level.106  The benefits denied to 
unauthorized aliens range from government contracts and licenses to 
retirement and other public assistance.107  However, exceptions are made 
 
decisions, expanding deportability grounds, and limiting discretionary relief for immigration 
law violations); see also Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 
CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1633 (1997). 
 99. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 502; Spiro, supra 
note 98, at 1637. 
 100. Spiro, supra note 98, at 1637; see 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006) (authorizing 
agreements with the Attorney General to allow state or local officers to investigate, 
apprehend, and detain aliens); see also id. § 1103(a)(10) (allowing the Attorney General to 
delegate enforcement of immigration law to the states in situations of “an actual or imminent 
mass influx of aliens”). 
 101. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10). 
 102. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sessions of 8, 25, and 42 U.S.C. 
(2000)). 
 103. Kobach, supra note 85, at 466. 
 104. Spiro, supra note 98, at 1637. 
 105. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621; Kobach, supra note 85, at 466. 
 106. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1611, 1621.  The provisions that deny public benefits to 
unqualified aliens state that ineligible aliens cannot receive “any grant, contract, loan, 
professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of a State or local 
government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government.” Id. § 1621(c)(1)(A).  
Another section further disqualifies unauthorized aliens from most public benefits funded by 
state or local government agencies, such as “any retirement, welfare, health, disability, 
public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, 
or any other similar benefit[s].” Id. § 1621(c)(1)(B).  The language disqualifying ineligible 
aliens from the same federal benefits is nearly identical, but replaces “by an agency of a 
State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government” with “by 
an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States.” Id.; compare 
id., with id. § 1611(c)(1). 
 107. Id. §§ 1601, 1611, 1621. 
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for emergency situations108 and K–12 education, which the Supreme Court 
mandated in Plyler v. Doe.109  After the PRWORA, state and local 
governments that wish to provide public benefits to ineligible aliens must 
enact legislation that “affirmatively provides” for such aliens’ eligibility.110 
Through the PRWORA, the federal government further enlisted state and 
local governments by explicitly authorizing them “to require an applicant 
for State and local public benefits . . . to provide proof of eligibility.”111  
While empowering state and local governments, Congress also sought to 
improve the effectiveness of the expanded regulatory scheme by barring 
state and local governments from “prohibit[ing], or in any way restrict[ing] 
[any state or local government entities], from sending to or receiving from 
the [federal immigration officials] information regarding the immigration 
status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.”112  The 
PRWORA clearly manifests the federal government’s intent to work 
concurrently with and to require the state and local governments to ensure 
compliance and tighten the federal statutory scheme.113 
Most recently, various iterations of the Clear Law Enforcement for 
Criminal Alien Removal Act (CLEAR Act or the Act) have been introduced 
in Congress since 2005.114  The Act was introduced again in 2007115 and in 
2009.116  The Act’s purpose is to reaffirm states’ and localities’ inherent 
police powers to investigate, apprehend, detain, transport, and remove 
noncitizens from the United States.117  The three versions all proclaim that 
state and local sovereign authority “to investigate, identify, apprehend, 
arrest, detain, or transfer to Federal custody aliens in the United States . . . 
has never been displaced or preempted by Congress.”118 
The development of the federal exclusivity doctrine illustrates the 
historical concerns that triggered the Court to curb the original practice of 
state regulation of immigration.119  History shows that the federal 
exclusivity doctrine in immigration is not in the constitutional text, but that 
it was judicially created in response to increased state regulation at a time 
when a uniform national approach best reflected the country’s interests.120  
 
 108. Id. §§ 1611(b), 1621(b). 
 109. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that public schools cannot refuse to provide 
education to undocumented children); see also Kobach, supra note 85, at 466–67. 
 110. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d); see also Kobach, supra note 85, at 467 & n.40. 
 111. 8 U.S.C. § 1625. 
 112. Id. § 1644; Kobach, supra note 85, at 468. 
 113. Kobach, supra note 85, at 467–68. But see Archibold, supra note 10, at A18. 
 114. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act (CLEAR Act), H.R. 3137, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
 115. CLEAR Act, H.R. 3494, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 116. CLEAR Act, H.R. 2406, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. § 2. 
 119. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 610; see supra notes 48–75 and accompanying text. 
 120. Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs:  Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and 
Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 72–
73 (2007) (“[J]udicial justifications for national exclusivity based on constitutional mandates 
are court-made doctrines to mediate federalist problems.”); Rodríguez, supra note 2, at  
610–11. 
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However, the last thirty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
congressional statutes, and scholarly debate indicate that the façade of 
federal exclusivity in the immigration context has eroded or is beginning to 
crumble.121 
The current immigration debate regarding state-local legislation affecting 
immigrants demonstrates that there may be room for state-local presence in 
the immigration context.122  The presumption of federal exclusivity may 
have expired as the current debate implicates important state and local 
concerns with public health, safety, and welfare of their constituents.123  
The landscape that shaped congressional plenary power over immigration 
law in the late 1800s is now moving towards a power sharing theory,124 
which can move comprehensive immigration reform forward, but also 
highlights the potential creation of brown sundown towns in the absence of 
such reform.  Thus, it is important to understand the interaction among 
federal exclusivity in immigration, sundown towns, and the preemption 
doctrine. 
D. The Preemption Doctrine 
The Constitution and laws made in pursuance of it are “the supreme law 
of the land . . . anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the 
contrary notwithstanding.”125  When the Constitution gives Congress the 
exclusive power to regulate a policy area, the states may not legislate in that 
area because “the Constitution of its own force requires preemption of such 
state regulation.”126  However, when the Constitution does not explicitly 
grant federal exclusivity over a subject matter, then both state governments 
and the federal government can legislate within the same area, compelling 
courts to engage in in-depth preemption analyses.127  Any state law that 
interferes or conflicts with the Constitution or an act of Congress succumbs, 
and is not enforceable.128  Federal law can preempt state law in three ways:  
through express preemption, implied conflict preemption, and implied field 
preemption.129 
 
 121. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 613–20; see supra notes 76–118 and accompanying text. 
 122. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 616. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 617–638. 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 126. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976). 
 127. Cf. id. (stating that the issue of whether federal regulation of immigration displaces a 
state’s regulation of aliens would be irrelevant if the Constitution granted the federal 
government power over all regulations affecting aliens).  The Court in De Canas continued: 
[T]here would have been no need, in [previous cases examining state statutes 
affecting aliens] . . . even to discuss the relevant congressional enactments in 
finding pre-emption of state regulation if all state regulation of aliens was ipso 
facto regulation of immigration, for the existence vel non of federal regulation is 
wholly irrelevant if the Constitution of its own force requires pre-emption of such 
state regulation. 
Id. 
 128. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 36:9 (7th ed. 2009). 
 129. Id. 
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1. Generally 
The clearest expression of congressional preemption of state law is 
through explicit statutory language, or express preemption.130  Generally, 
Congress can achieve express preemption in statutes by including a 
preemption clause, which explains the type of state laws or actions that are 
displaced.131 
However, express preemptive language is not always included in federal 
laws.  In such cases, the courts can imply preemption by examining 
legislative intent and history.132  This approach is known as implied 
preemption, and it breaks down into two sub-approaches:  field and conflict 
preemption.133  Implied field preemption occurs when the federal legislative 
scheme is so comprehensive “that no room remains for supplemental state 
legislation.”134  Field preemption also occurs when national uniformity is 
important to achieve dominant federal interests.135  The second type of 
implied preemption is conflict preemption.136  It happens when a federal 
law’s goals show a direct, actual, and irreconcilable conflict, so that the 
federal and state acts cannot coexist.137 
Courts should presume that Congress does not intend to displace state 
law.138  As such, preemption should only be “found if the federal law 
clearly evinces a legislative intent to preempt the state law, or there is such 
direct and positive conflict that the two acts cannot be reconciled or 
consistently stand together.”139  Furthermore, there is a presumption against 
federal preemption of state law in traditional areas of state power, like their 
historic police powers over public health, safety, welfare, and domestic 
relations.140  The presumption does not apply when the state legislation 
regulates an area “where there has been a history of significant federal 
presence.”141 
Accordingly, topics not addressed in “a comprehensive and detailed 
federal statutory scheme are presumably left subject to disposition by state 
law.”142  The presumption against federal preemption of state law is 
particularly strong when a federal law touches areas traditionally regulated 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.; supra text accompanying notes 128–30. 
 132. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 128, § 36:9. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518 n.41 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, slip op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010); SINGER & SINGER, 
supra note 128, § 36:9. 
 139. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 128, § 36:9. 
 140. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); SINGER & SINGER, 
supra note 128, § 36:9. 
 141. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518 n.41 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 
108 (2000)). 
 142. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 128, § 36:9. 
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by the states.143  In such cases, courts impose a higher standard and “the 
state law must do major damage to the clear and substantial federal interests 
in order for the preemption doctrine to apply.”144  Court review of 
immigration-related laws at the state-local level falls on both sides of the 
spectrum.145 
2. Preemption As Applied in the Immigration Context 
As the Supreme Court stated in De Canas, not every state or local 
regulation affecting immigrants is a regulation of immigration.146  
Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Part II, courts take divergent 
approaches regarding the breadth of federal activity in the immigration 
field, specifically as it relates to employment and housing provisions 
enacted at the state-local level.147  The recent explosion of state and local 
legislative activity seeking to address state and local concerns by enforcing 
immigration law illustrates the divergent approaches.148  One camp, 
exemplified by Lozano v. City of Hazleton,149 adopted a wide preemption 
analysis, which favors federal preemption of state laws that address the 
employment of aliens.150  The other camp, epitomized by Chicanos Por La 
Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,151 employed a presumption against preemption, 
by searching for actual conflict between the federal and state laws, because 
the employment and housing fields have predominantly been occupied by 
the states.152 
The divergent approaches can be traced to how the particular court 
defines “immigration.”153  Black’s Law Dictionary defines immigration as 
“the act of entering a country with the intention of settling there 
permanently.”154  This definition is in line with the De Canas Court’s 
determination that a regulation of immigration “is essentially a 
determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and 
the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”155  In De Canas, 
the Court further explained that even when a federal and a state law are 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See infra Part II.A. 
 146. 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976); see supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Susan M. Bartlett, Comment, Grass Roots Immigration Reform, 69 LA. L. REV. 
989, 994–1005 (2009). See generally McKanders, supra note 81; Karla Mari McKanders, 
Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” Immigrants Beware:  Local Immigration Ordinances and 
What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2007) (arguing that 
immigration-related legislation at the subnational level is unconstitutional).  
 148. See Gulasekaram, supra note 4, at 1480–81; Archibold, supra note 10, at A18. 
 149. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, slip 
op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010). 
 150. Id.; see also McKanders, supra note 81, at 593–96. 
 151. 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), amended by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, ____ S. Ct. ____, 78 U.S.L.W. 3762 
(U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115). 
 152. Infra Part II.A.2; see also Kobach, supra note 85, at 470–82. 
 153. McKanders, supra note 81, at 595–96. 
 154. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 765 (8th ed. 2004). 
 155. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976). 
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within the same policy area, the state law should not be preempted unless 
there are persuasive reasons to conclude that both governmental systems 
cannot simultaneously regulate the subject matter or Congress has 
unmistakably so preempted state-local participation in the field.156  The 
decision stated that courts should not presume a federal intention to oust 
state authority within their traditional police powers to regulate consistently 
with federal laws.157  The Court found that a “clear and manifest” 
demonstration that Congress intended complete ouster of state power, 
including the power to promulgate laws harmonious with and not in conflict 
with federal laws, was necessary to justify federal preemption of a state law 
falling within the state’s police powers.158 
A broader definition of immigration, on the other hand, emphasizes 
federal authority to overturn state and local laws of which aliens are the 
subject, deeming the laws to be regulations of immigration.  Courts 
adopting a broader definition of immigration reason that the “[p]ower to 
regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power,”159 
because national uniformity in immigration is required to avoid foreign 
relations problems with other nations.160  The argument is that the 
definition of immigration is broader than determining who gets to come in 
and who has to go.161  To proponents of this approach, a definition of 
immigration must be expansive enough to encompass all areas in which the 
federal government has regulated with respect to immigration, even when 
the federal law does not explicitly oust the states from the federal 
scheme.162  The range of permissible state-local action within the 
immigration scheme is guided by statutory and case law on the issue. 
E. Scope of the States’ Police Powers Within the Immigration Context 
When the Supreme Court declared federal exclusivity over immigration, 
states used their police powers to pass statutes that discriminated against 
immigrants.163  In the initial stages of this type of state legislation, the 
Court “did not perceive any reason why the state[s] could not discriminate 
against non-citizens.”164  However, in 1948, the Court began to constrict the 
 
 156. Id. at 355–56 (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 
(1963)). 
 157. Id. at 357–58. 
 158. Id. (citing Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 146). 
 159. Id. at 354. 
 160. McKanders, supra note 147, at 37–39; see also Jason Englund, Note, Small Town 
Defenders or Constitutional Foes:  Does the Hazleton, PA Anti-Illegal-Immigration 
Ordinance Encroach on Federal Power?, 87 B.U. L. REV. 883, 904 (2007). 
 161. McKanders, supra note 147, at 27–29. 
 162. Id.; see also Englund, supra note 160, at 898–900. 
 163. Cf. Valerie L. Barth, Comment, Anti-Immigrant Backlash and the Role of the 
Judiciary:  A Proposal for Heightened Review of Federal Laws Affecting Immigrants, 29 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 105, 121 & n.56 (1997) (describing the use of the public interest doctrine 
against immigrants).  States also relied on their police powers to regulate public safety to 
discriminate against immigrants. Id. at 121–22 nn.57–59 (citing various Supreme Court 
cases that weighed states’ police powers more heavily than other constitutional rights). 
 164. Id. at 123. 
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states’ use of this type of legislation.165  In a departure from its recent 
jurisprudence on the issue, the Court determined that a state statute that 
discriminated equally among immigrants was unconstitutional.166  The case 
further decreased the states’ ability to respond to immigrant influxes.  
Finally, in 1971, the Court’s decision in Graham v. Richardson167 rejected a 
state’s interest in conserving welfare benefits for its citizens as a valid 
reason for discriminating against immigrants.168  Thus, the Court severely 
curtailed the states’ ability to pass legislation that affected immigrants.169  
Despite the Court’s decisions, subsequent federal legislation contemplates a 
role for the states to pass laws of which aliens are the subject.170 
As such, the states’ ability to conserve limited resources for their citizens 
and those authorized to reside or work in the United States requires a 
delicate balance to avoid the ambiguous boundaries of federal exclusivity 
and permissible subnational action in the immigration context.171  States 
cannot define admission, exclusion, deportability criteria, or create new 
immigration statuses.172  States also may not enact laws in a policy area in 
which Congress has expressed or implied an intention to preempt state 
laws.173   
De Canas provides important guidance regarding the type of legislation 
states may enact.174  In its decision, the Court determined that “states 
possess considerable authority to act in ways that affect immigration 
 
 165. Id. at 123–24. 
 166. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1948); see also Barth, 
supra note 163, at 123–24 (describing the Court’s decision in Takahashi as “unlike past 
decisions in which the Court found the state’s special public interest more important than an 
immigrant’s constitutional rights,” so that the state’s interest in its resources “was inadequate 
to justify its discriminatory behavior against immigrants”). 
 167. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 168. Id. at 374. 
 169. See Barth, supra note 163, at 125.  The Court’s rejection of the states’ interest in 
preserving and allocating limited resources, and labeling classifications based on alienage at 
the state level as “suspect,” set the stage for the strict-scrutiny standard now applied to state 
laws that discriminate against immigrants. Id. at 125–26.  The contrary is true for federal 
laws that treat immigrants differently. Id. at 127, 134.  The Court is extremely deferential 
based on Congress’s plenary power over immigration, which has been expanded to “laws 
that implicate no foreign policy interest.” Id. at 133 (“For example, the Supreme Court in 
Mathews v. Diaz cautioned against judicial review of immigration laws by stating the 
‘reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of 
review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and 
naturalization.’” Id. at 133–34 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976))). 
 170. See supra notes 97–113 and accompanying text. 
 171. Kobach, supra note 85, at 463–64; John Schwartz & Randal C. Archibold, A Law 
Facing a Tough Road Through the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, at A17. 
 172. Kobach, supra note 85, at 464. 
 173. Id. at 464 & n.26 (describing some types of immigration-related laws that are 
preempted by federal law). 
 174. Id. at 464 (“As the Supreme Court declared in the landmark immigration preemption 
case of De Canas v. Bica, ‘standing alone, the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute 
does not render it a [prohibited] regulation of immigration, which is essentially a 
determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions 
under which a legal entrant may remain.’” (alteration in original) (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 
424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976))). 
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without being preempted by the [relevant federal immigration law].”175  In 
other words, states may continue to legislate in the field of immigration by 
enacting laws that:  deny public benefits, driver’s licenses, or resident 
tuition rates to unauthorized aliens; prohibit the employment of 
unauthorized aliens; “mirror federal immigration crimes”; and provide 
“state and local law enforcement assistance to [Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE)].”176  As recognized by another federal district court,177 
as long as the state or local legislation uses federal statutory classifications 
or determinations, it is not preempted.178 
The erosion of the judicially created federal exclusivity doctrine—
plenary power—in the immigration context through case law and 
congressional statutes set the stage for the current immigration debate.179  
Part II of this Note focuses on two divergent preemption approaches to the 
state-local immigration legislation debate.  Additionally, Part II explores 
three scholarship models to the immigration regulatory scheme.  Part II also 
looks at the background and aftermath of each case to find a correlation 
between the preemption approaches, the scholarship models, and the 
prevention of a new wave of sundown towns. 
II. DIVERGENT PREEMPTION APPROACHES IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT 
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
This Part describes two preemption approaches used to review state-local 
legislation that affects immigrants or immigration.  It also lays out three 
scholarship models to evaluate the federal and state-local roles with respect 
to immigration regulation.  Part II.A illustrates two courts’ divergent 
approaches to preemption analysis with respect to state-local legislation 
affecting the employment and housing of immigrants.  Part II.B discusses 
 
 175. Id. at 464.  The De Canas Court stated explicitly that Congress did not occupy the 
entire field of immigration. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357 (“Of course, even state regulation 
designed to protect vital state interests must give way to paramount federal legislation.  But 
we will not presume that Congress, in enacting the INA, intended to oust state authority to 
regulate the employment relationship . . . in a manner consistent with pertinent federal laws.  
Only a demonstration that complete ouster of state power—including state power to 
promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws—was ‘the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress’ would justify that conclusion.” (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963))).  The Court indicated that a state statute is not preempted 
absent “any specific indication in either the wording or the legislative history of the INA that 
Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in 
general.” Id. at 358. 
 176. Kobach, supra note 85, at 465 (listing eight areas in which states or localities can act 
without being preempted). 
 177. Id. at 468 (discussing similar provisions upheld in Friendly House v. Napolitano, 
D.C. No. CV-04-00649-DCB (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2004), vacated on other grounds, 419 F.3d 
930 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 178. Id. (“These judicial decisions confirmed what was already clear:  states are on solid 
legal ground if they follow the requirements of federal law and deny public benefits to illegal 
aliens, using the [federal] program to verify with the federal government the legal status of 
any alien applicant. . . .  This is perhaps the easiest step that can be taken to remove an 
incentive for continued unlawful presence and further illegal immigration.”). 
 179. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 611–20; see supra Part I.C. 
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current state legislation.  Part II.C then reviews each scholarship model—
federal exclusivity, state and local regulation, and cooperative federalism. 
A. Preemption as Applied by the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the 
Ninth Circuit 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton180 and Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. 
Napolitano181 illustrate the divergent approaches used to conduct a 
preemption analysis in the immigration context.182  The Lozano model 
reflects a broad approach to preemption and relies on the vague federal 
exclusivity boundaries in the immigration area.183  The Chicanos Por La 
Causa model illustrates a narrow and “normalized” preemption analysis.184  
Thus, if the court determines that the INA occupies the entire immigration 
field, then the state or local law affecting immigrants will be preempted.185  
However, if the court follows the narrow De Canas approach,186 a law that 
affects immigrants is not a per se immigration regulation and consequently 
not preempted if the state acts within its police powers in enacting the 
law.187 
1. Lozano v. City of Hazleton 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania, is a small town located in Luzerne County, 
approximately eighty miles from Philadelphia.188  The 2000 Census 
indicated Hazleton’s population was about 23,000; however, by 2005 the 
City’s population had increased to over 30,000.189  The demographic 
explosion came after the terrorist attacks of September 11, when many 
immigrants from the New York metropolitan area, both legal and 
undocumented, headed to Hazleton, Pennsylvania for more jobs and 
opportunities.190  The population increase led to additional costs in social 
and educational services in the small town.191  For example, a school built 
 
 180. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, slip 
op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010). 
 181. 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), amended by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, ____ S. Ct. ____, 78 U.S.L.W. 3762 
(U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115). 
 182. McKanders, supra note 81, at 592–96. 
 183. Id. at 596 (Professor Karla Mari McKanders believes the correct approach to 
preemption analysis is one that “broadly interpret[s] Congress’s power to regulate 
immigration”). 
 184. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 620. 
 185. McKanders, supra note 81, at 596. 
 186. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
 187. McKanders, supra note 81, at 592. 
 188. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, slip op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010); Englund, supra note 
160, at 884. 
 189. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 484; see also Kris W. Kobach, Administrative Law:  
Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1323, 1327 (2008); 
Englund, supra note 160, at 887. 
 190. Rachel E. Morse, Following Lozano v. Hazleton:  Keep State and Cities Out of the 
Immigration Business, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 513, 529 (2008) (book review). 
 191. Englund, supra note 160, at 887. 
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for only 1800 students had to accommodate about 2500 students, the town’s 
budget for teaching English as a second language grew from $500 per year 
to $875,000, and “unreimbursed health care costs increased 60%” over a 
two year period.192  Additionally, the criminal arrests of undocumented 
immigrants created a communal perception of increased criminal 
activity.193  This combination of factors led the City of Hazleton to pass its 
Illegal Immigration Relief Act (IIRA) in 2006.194 
Hazleton’s IIRA consisted of various ordinances to combat the 
employment and harboring of undocumented aliens, as well as the Official 
English Ordinance, which declared English as the City’s official 
language.195  The legislature acted on the community’s desire to curtail the 
increased fiscal burdens and criminal activity allegedly resulting from 
Hazleton’s undocumented alien population.196  The version that became the 
law of the City of Hazleton was Ordinance 2007-6, which amended specific 
sections of Ordinance 2006-18, but enveloped the rest of 2006-18.197  The 
Lozano decision of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania was based on 2007-6 and determined that the previous 
versions were similar enough and were encompassed in the review of 2007-
6.198 
The ordinance used the term “illegal alien” and defined it as “an alien 
who is not lawfully present in the United States, according to the terms of 
United States Code Title 8, section 1101 et seq.”199  It stated that the City 
and its officials could only determine immigration status by verifying a 
person’s information with the federal government.200  The City of Hazleton 
could not make independent determinations about a person’s immigration 
status, but had to await federal verification.  Thus, the federal government 
 
 192. Id. (citing Julia Vitullo-Martin, Editorial, Save Our Cities, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 
2007, at W13, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_wsj-
save_our_cities.htm). 
 193. See Michael Powell & Michelle García, Pa. City Puts Illegal Immigrants on Notice, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2006, at A3.  Allegedly, in 2006, four Dominican immigrants were 
arrested in connection with a fatal shooting, and a fourteen-year-old undocumented 
immigrant opened fire at a playground. Englund, supra note 160, at 887.  There is no 
evidence linking undocumented immigrants with Hazleton’s increase in crime. Id.  However, 
the fact that undocumented aliens were involved sufficed to create the communal belief that 
an increased presence of undocumented aliens correlated to the increase in crime. Id. 
 194. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
 195. See id.; Powell & García, supra note 193, at A3.  The IIRA was amended various 
times, the last version was Ordinance 2007-6. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 515.  The 
amendments were most likely in response to litigation. See id.  However, this discussion will 
treat all amendments as one and equivalent to Ordinance 2007-6, which became the law of 
the City and was the version on which the district court ruled. Id. at 515–16. 
 196. Englund, supra note 160, at 888–89 (quoting Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-10, § 
2(A) (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/Originalordinance.pdf). 
 197. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2007-6 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/hazletonord607.pdf.  Ordinance 2006-18 was the original 
law, but was later amended in response to the litigation. 
 198. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 
 199. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 3(D) (Sept. 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/hazletonsecondordinance.pdf. 
 200. Id. 
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would have made the immigration status determination and then transmitted 
that information to Hazleton officials. 
The ordinance’s employment provisions stated that it was unlawful to 
hire, recruit, continue to employ, permit, dispatch, or instruct “unlawful 
worker[s] to perform work in whole or part within the City.”201  
Accordingly, the law established enforcement and administrative 
procedures to ensure and facilitate compliance.202  Employers that adhered 
to the law’s verification procedures were protected from license 
suspension.203  In contrast, an employer’s business license could be 
suspended for failure to comply or correct violations.204  The suspensions 
varied depending on the severity and length of the violation.205 
Similarly, the law’s housing provisions attempted to mimic federal 
standards.  The “Harboring Illegal Aliens” section of the IIRA made it 
unlawful “to let, lease, or rent a dwelling unit to an illegal alien, knowing or 
in reckless disregard” of a person’s unauthorized status.206  It defined a 
person with unauthorized status as a person in the United States in violation 
of the immigration law.207  As with the employment section, the harboring 
provision also set enforcement and administrative procedures.208  
Landlords’ rental licenses were subject to fines of $250 per day or to 
suspension for a violation or failing to correct violations, respectively.209  
As a companion to the IIRA, the City’s registration ordinance required 
landlords to register current tenants by providing certain identifying 
information and to obtain rental licenses before leasing to new or renewing 
tenants.210  Prospective and renewing tenants also had to obtain occupancy 
permits.211  The occupancy permit application required the applicants to 
supply personal information, including “[p]roper identification showing 
proof of legal citizenship and/or residency.”212  Property owners who 
adhered to the ordinance’s administrative procedures by verifying a tenant’s 
immigration status were safe from the penalty provision.213 
Both the employment and harboring sections contained the same 
language regarding the potential for discriminatory application.214  The 
IIRA’s relevant sections invalidated and made unenforceable any 
complaints primarily based on “national origin, ethnicity, or race.”215  The 
 
 201. Id. § 4(A). 
 202. Id. § 4(B)–(E). 
 203. Id. § 4(B)(5). 
 204. Id. § 4(B)(3)–(7). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. § 5(A)(1). 
 207. Id. § 5(A). 
 208. Id. § 5(A)(2)–(B). 
 209. Id. § 5(B)(3)–(8). 
 210. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13, § 6(a)–(c) (Aug. 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/hazletonfirstordinance.pdf. 
 211. Id. § 7(b). 
 212. Id. § 7(b)(1). 
 213. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 5(B)(9). 
 214. Id. § 4(B)(2), § 5(B)(2). 
 215. Id. 
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employment provisions also created a private cause of action to protect 
unfairly discharged employees,216 which was not replicated in the harboring 
or registration provisions. 
On August 15, 2006, Pedro Lozano and other Hazleton residents,217 
along with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Puerto 
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), sued to challenge the 
validity of the Hazleton ordinance and to enjoin its enforcement.218  The 
plaintiffs included lawful permanent residents of the United States, 
undocumented persons, and local groups, such as ethnic business 
organizations.219  The plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a private cause of action for any citizen or 
other person who is deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws” by a person acting under the color of 
state law.220  The plaintiffs claimed the ordinances could ensnare legal 
residents221 and created a climate of fear, causing people to avoid 
association with groups that expressed interest in the rights of Latino 
immigrants.222  Latino political activity became associated with 
undocumented status.223  The plaintiffs also alleged that in passing the 
ordinances, the City of Hazleton violated the “United States Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause, Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause and 
privacy guarantees.”224 
In analyzing the claims, the Lozano court subscribed to a broad 
preemption inquiry.  The district court struck down the Hazleton laws 
prohibiting employment and housing of undocumented immigrants.225  
With respect to the employment ordinance, the court determined that 
IRCA’s provision regulating the employment of immigrants was broad 
enough to preempt the law in question.226  The court found that the local 
 
 216. Id. § 4(E). 
 217. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 487–507 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, slip op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010) (discussing standing 
for all named, anonymous, and organizational plaintiffs). 
 218. Id. at 485; Powell & García, supra note 193, at A3. 
 219. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 485–86. 
 220. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 517. 
 221. See Powell & García, supra note 193, at A3.  This is possible because many 
undocumented immigrants are parts of “mixed families.” Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 496–97 
(detailing the story of John Doe 1, an undocumented immigrant, asked to vacate an 
apartment by a landlord, who was a family member, because the ordinance frightened the 
landlord); see Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:  Landlords, Latinos, 
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 53, 98 
(2009) (noting that “mixed families” refers to family structures “in which some members are 
citizens or have legal status and some lack legal status”).  Housing provisions targeting 
unauthorized aliens penalize mixed families and make it impossible for them to live together. 
Id. at 98–99. 
 222. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.12. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 517. 
 225. Id. at 517, 530–33, 554–55. 
 226. Id. at 518–29, 554–55; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006). 
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ordinance was outside IRCA’s savings clause,227 ignoring the statutory 
language that contemplates the states’ ability to further the federal 
regulatory scheme through their licensing laws.228  The court determined 
that before the states could exercise their power within the savings clause, 
federal officials must have found an IRCA violation.229  The court held that 
another reading would conflict with the federal government’s 
comprehensive scheme and result in state or local determinations as to 
which immigrants are authorized to work.230  Thus, the court determined 
the IIRA’s sanctioning scheme was not within IRCA’s savings provision.231 
The court next reviewed Hazleton’s housing ordinance, which instituted 
a sanctions scheme against landlords and tenants.232  The law prohibited 
landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants and sanctioned 
violators.233  The scheme required both landlords and tenants to obtain 
occupancy certificates issued by local authorities upon a determination that 
the tenants were authorized to reside in the United States.234  The ordinance 
targeted undocumented persons and prohibited them from renting housing 
in Hazleton.235  Using a broad preemption analysis, the court determined 
that the ordinance conflicted with federal immigration law.236  The court 
reasoned that the federal immigration laws and removability decisions were 
too complex to be implemented at the local level.237  The court also stated 
that since the federal government does not deport all unauthorized 
immigrants, the Hazleton law conflicted with federal policy.238  As such, 
the local scheme was expressly and impliedly preempted because it 
conflicted with Congress’s goals in the immigration area.239  On appeal, the 
 
 227. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518–29, 554–55; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (“The 
provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions 
(other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer 
for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”). 
 228. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 520–21 & n.42. 
 229. Id. at 520–21. 
 230. Id. at 521; see also McKanders, supra note 81, at 593. 
 231. The law would have been preempted under a conflict preemption analysis because it 
gave local officials the ability to determine immigration status. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 
517–29.  However, this Note focuses on the court’s express preemption analysis, which is 
different from a “normalized” approach, contradicts the statutory language, and ultimately 
prohibited the City of Hazleton from fixing its immigration status determination process to 
match the federal standard established in IRCA. See McKanders, supra note 81, at 593–94. 
 232. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 529–33. 
 233. Id. at 530. 
 234. See supra notes 178, 231 and accompanying text.  While such a scheme could also 
be challenged as violative of other federal statutes and constitutional protections, this Note 
does not explore those options. See generally Oliveri, supra note 221 (arguing the various 
housing ordinances are preempted because of federal exclusivity in the immigration area and 
possible Federal Housing Act violations); Kai Bartolomeo, Note, Immigration and the 
Constitutionality of Local Self Help:  Escondido’s Undocumented Immigrant Rental Ban, 17 
S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 855 (2008). 
 235. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 530–33. 
 236. Id. at 533. 
 237. Id. at 532. 
 238. Id. at 533; see supra notes 125–62 and accompanying text. 
 239. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 533.  The court emphasized Justice Blackmun’s 
concurrence in Plyler v. Doe, declaring that “‘the structure of the immigration statuses 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
determination that the employment and housing provisions were both pre-
empted by the INA.240 
In the midst of the IIRA litigation, Hazleton Mayor, Louis J. Barletta, 
remarked:  “I see illegal immigrants picking up and leaving—some 
Mexican restaurants say business is off 75 percent.”241  Hazleton’s 
immigrant families started moving away after the IIRA’s passage in 
2006.242  Despite the federal district court’s ruling that the ordinances were 
unconstitutional, the outward flows of people did not stop.243  Rudy 
Espinal, head of the Hazleton Hispanic Business Association, observed that 
people continued to leave because “they [did not] want their kids to grow 
up in an environment like this.”244 
Hazleton’s ordinances reverberated throughout the Pennsylvania 
Anthracite and Appalachian regions.  Places like Shenandoah and Altoona, 
with even smaller immigrant populations than Hazleton, considered similar 
legislation and fueled anti-immigrant sentiment.245  Approximately one 
year later, Luis Ramirez, a twenty-five-year-old Mexican and father of two, 
was murdered in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, a town twenty miles from 
Hazleton, in an ethnically motivated crime.246  The attack on Ramirez was 
brutal.  He was knocked to the ground and kicked multiple times in the 
head, resulting in loss of consciousness, convulsions, and foaming at the 
mouth.247  The attackers, identified as local teenagers, were apprehended 
and tried; their charges ranged from simple assault to civil rights 
violations.248  The murder took place as Shenandoah considered a law 
similar to Hazleton’s IIRA but held off after observing Hazleton’s litigation 
 
makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and 
which eventually will be deported.’” Id. at 532 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 
(1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 240. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, slip op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010). 
 241. Powell & García, supra note 193, at A3. 
 242. Emily Bazar, Illegal Immigrants Moving Out, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2007, at 3A. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Sean D. Hamill, Altoona, With No Immigrant Problem, Decides To Solve It, N.Y 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A34 [hereinafter Hamill, Altoona]; Sean D. Hamill, Mexican’s Death 
Bares a Town’s Ethnic Tension, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, at A12 [hereinafter Hamill, 
Mexican’s Death]. 
 246. LEADERSHIP CONF. ON C.R. EDUC. FUND, CONFRONTING THE NEW FACES OF HATE:  
HATE CRIMES IN AMERICA 17 (2009), available at 
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/hatecrimes/lccref_hate_crimes_report.pdf.  The 
attackers allegedly yelled, “This is Shenandoah, this is America, go back to Mexico,” and 
“Tell your fucking Mexican friends to get the fuck out of Shenandoah or you’ll be fucking 
laying next to them.” Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. In May 2009, two of the teens were convicted of simple assault, a misdemeanor, and 
were acquitted of murder, aggravated assault, and ethnic intimidation. Id.  Another teenager 
pleaded guilty in federal court to a civil rights violation in exchange for having the third-
degree murder, aggravated assault, and other counts against him dropped. Id.  The two 
teenagers who had been acquitted of murder were indicted on federal hate crime charges. 
Wendy Sefsaf, Shenandoah is a Cautionary Tale for how to Debate Immigration Reform, 
IMMIGRATION IMPACT, (Dec. 16, 2009), http://immigrationimpact.com/
2009/12/16/shenandoah–is–a–cautionary–tale–for–how–to–debate–immigration–reform/. 
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troubles.249  Nevertheless, Hazleton’s IIRA provoked discussion in 
Shenandoah, which created tensions between the town’s Latino and White 
communities despite formerly peaceful relations.250  “Many people 
believe[d] the debate fueled by Hazleton’s actions helped create the 
environment that led to Mr. Ramirez’s death.”251  The failed attempt at 
legislative action combined with “inflammatory rhetoric in the immigration 
debate . . . correlat[es] with increased violence against Latinos.”252  
Therefore, Lozano shows that broad preemption analyses displace 
communal legislative attempts to allocate resources, which are replaced 
with ethnically motivated violence or harassment—setting the stage for a 
brown sundown town. 
2. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano 
The state of Arizona passed a law similar to Hazleton’s IIRA to address 
resource allocation and criminality concerns.  During the 1990s, increased 
border patrol presence across the California and Texas borders with Mexico 
diverted flows of undocumented immigrants to the Arizona border.253  
Deaths on the Arizona border “account for half of all border deaths.”254  In 
addition to increased border crossings into Arizona, drug cartel-related 
violence accentuated the sense of danger.255  Arizona border residents 
reported an increase in burglaries and other violent property crimes.256  For 
example, during the 2000 Presidential campaign, Pat Buchanan told 
Theresa Murray’s story.257  Murray is an elderly woman who lives near 
Douglas, Arizona.258  Her house is surrounded by chain-link fence and 
“[s]he sleeps with a gun on her bed table because she has been burglarized 
30 times.”259  In response to the porous border and dangerous activity, 
Arizona passed a law in 2005 that extended felony immigrant-smuggling 
charges to state jurisdiction.260 
A border state, Arizona constantly struggles with how to reduce the 
number of undocumented immigrants, who are part of the state’s 
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 254. George Ciccariello-Maher, Arizona:  Ground Zero in Immigration’s New Race 
Wars, COUNTERPUNCH (Dec. 26, 2008), http://www.alternet.org/story/115032/. 
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Threatening To Engulf Our Entire Nation, NEW AM., Aug. 7, 2006, at 25-28. 
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workforce.261  Undocumented workers account for approximately ten 
percent of Arizona’s workforce.262  Furthermore, various organizational 
surveys indicate that Arizona’s undocumented population increased 
dramatically from the mid-1990s through 2006.263  In October 1996, the 
unauthorized population was estimated at around 115,000.264  By 2006, the 
estimate had ballooned to a range from 400,000 to 500,000.265  The state’s 
answer to the problem came in the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA).266  
The statute was enacted on July 2, 2007 and became effective on January 1, 
2008.267  It reflects Arizona’s response to the hiring of undocumented aliens 
by its businesses.268  This conflation of factors likely catalyzed the 
enactment of LAWA. 
LAWA prohibits employers from “knowingly” hiring undocumented 
workers.269  LAWA defers to federal law to define “unauthorized alien.”270  
It creates a comprehensive administrative and enforcement structure 
providing for investigation, adjudication, and sanctions.271  The sanctions 
range from a probationary period to suspension and revocation of 
employers’ business licenses, depending on the number of previous 
violations and other factors.272  To help employers comply with the federal 
and state laws, the law mandates the use of E-Verify, the federal online 
verification program, to confirm that all new employees are authorized to 
work in the United States.273  LAWA also creates a voluntary program 
through which employers agree to perform additional checks using federal 
databases to ensure compliance.274  Voluntary enrollment in the program 
protects employers from findings of violations if they adhere to the 
program’s guidelines.275 
 
 261. Feller, supra note 90, at 302. 
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PageServer?pagename=research_research82b2 (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
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 266. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-216 (2009). 
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In July 2007, a month after the law’s enactment, businesses and civil 
rights organizations brought a facial challenge against the Act.276  The 
initial action was dismissed because none of the county attorneys 
responsible for enforcing the Act were named as defendants.277  In 
December 2007, a second action was instituted, naming appropriate 
defendants:  fifteen Arizona state county attorneys, the governor, and the 
attorney general, among others.278  The suit alleged that the Arizona law 
was preempted by federal law.279  The district court determined that LAWA 
was within IRCA’s savings clause and thus was not expressly preempted by 
federal law.280  The court also found that LAWA’s sanctions provisions and 
mandatory use of E-Verify were not inconsistent with federal policy and 
therefore were not impliedly preempted.281  The plaintiffs appealed the 
decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.282 
In contrast to the Lozano court, in Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. 
Napolitano,283 the Ninth Circuit performed a narrow preemption analysis to 
approach the Arizona statute.284  The Ninth Circuit determined that the 
statute fell within IRCA’s saving clause285 because a state’s business 
licensing requirements were part of the state’s power to regulate 
employment.286  To reach this conclusion, the court focused on established 
case law, stating that “[w]hen Congress legislates ‘in a field which the 
States have traditionally occupied . . . . we start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.’”287  The court also invoked the Supreme Court’s language in De 
Canas.288 
The court also found that Arizona’s requirement that all employers 
participate in the E-Verify program did not conflict with or impede the 
federal government’s goals in the immigration area.289  Even though E-
 
 276. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2008), 
amended by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. 
Candelaria, ____ S. Ct. ____, 78 U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).  It was a 
facial challenge because the law had yet to be enforced against any employer. Id. 
 277. Id. at 981. 
 278. Id. at 979. 
 279. Id. at 981–82.  The plaintiffs also alleged due process violations because LAWA did 
not give employers “an adequate opportunity to dispute the federal government’s response 
that an employee was not authorized to work.” Id. at 982.  The court held that the employer’s 
due process rights were adequately protected. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008).   
 284. Id. at 982–86. 
 285. See id. But see supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 286. Chicanos Por La Causa, 544 F.3d at 983–84. 
 287. Id. at 983 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 
(2000)). 
 288. Id.; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 289. Chicanos Por La Causa, 544 F.3d at 985–86.  The electronic-based system is an 
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Verify is voluntary under the federal scheme, the court determined that 
Arizona’s statute actually advanced Congress’s goal to expand and 
encourage participation in the program.290  The court reached its conclusion 
not only because of its narrow express and implied preemption analysis, but 
also because LAWA language adopted federal definitions and processes to 
determine employment eligibility.291 
Even though LAWA survived the legal challenge, the law has been 
difficult to enforce.292  The county attorneys charged with prosecuting 
violations do not have subpoena power to obtain personnel records from 
employers, which is crucial to prove the employers knowingly hired 
undocumented workers.293  Thus, most investigations do not yield enough 
evidence to proceed with an employer sanctions case.294  In November 
2009, the first case under the Act was filed in Maricopa County against an 
employer for knowingly hiring an unauthorized worker.295  In December 
2009, Waterworld became the first Arizona business to experience the 
punitive impact of the law.296  The employer’s business license was 
suspended for ten days under a settlement with the Maricopa County 
Attorney’s Office.297 
Despite enforcement difficulties, LAWA has had a deterrent effect, as 
illustrated by the exodus of mostly Latino immigrants since the law’s 
passage.298  It is reported that about 100 Latinos per day move to Texas as a 
result of the “immigration crackdowns in Oklahoma and Arizona.”299  The 
exodus is visible in the decreased availability of workers in industries that 
rely heavily on Latino labor, such as the restaurant300 and construction 
industries.301  Employers also are reporting a decrease in both legal and 
undocumented workers.302  The outward flow of Arizona’s undocumented 
 
 290. Id. at 986. 
 291. Id. at 985. 
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2009, at 3. 
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 297. Hensley & Kiefer, supra note 296.  Whether this sanction’s instance is a success 
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available at 2008 WLNR 26580674. 
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 301. McFeely, supra note 299. 
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(quoting Jason LaVecke, owner of restaurant franchises in Arizona)); see also McFeely, 
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population was also reflected in housing trends.303  As early as January 
2008, Arizona landlords reported that “thousands of alien tenants had 
vacated their apartments.”304  LAWA’s effect also was noticed at the 
federal level by then-Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff.305  
He observed that since Arizona’s law was upheld, the federal government 
was “beginning to see that illegal workers are picking up and leaving, 
because they recognize this system is an impediment to their continued 
illegal activities and illegal employment in this country.”306 
Along with a decrease in the Latino labor force in Arizona, there has 
been an increase in race-motivated hate crimes.307  The national trend 
indicates that hate crimes against Latinos and others perceived to be 
immigrants has steadily increased.308  According to a report by the U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Arizona police departments reported 
185 hate crimes during 2008, compared with 161 in 2007.309  Finally, the 
renewal of Maricopa County’s agreement with the federal government 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g),310 led by Sheriff Joe Arpaio, along with Arpaio’s 
targeted and aggressive law enforcement techniques to enforce Arizona’s 
human smuggling law, 311 may be increasing resentment against Arizona’s 
immigrants, both authorized and undocumented.312 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Chicanos Por La Causa Provides New Impetus for 
Arizona’s Continued Involvement with Immigration-Related Laws at the 
State Level 
On April 23, 2010, Arizona’s governor, Jan Brewer, signed into law 
Senate Bill 1070 (S.B. 1070).313  The law goes beyond LAWA and is the 
country’s toughest and broadest effort to control undocumented 
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immigration at the subnational level.314  It amends various Arizona statutes, 
including LAWA, such that in its entirety, the bill is a concerted effort to 
facilitate the prosecution and deportation of undocumented immigrants and 
discourage their presence in Arizona.315  As such, the law is hailed as a 
much needed tool for the state “to solve a crisis . . . [that] the federal 
government has refused to fix.”316 
The law’s broad scope aims to reduce undocumented immigrants’ ability 
to stay under the radar in Arizona.317  Most prominently, the law 
criminalized as a misdemeanor the failure to carry immigration 
documents.318  It also empowered the local police to detain people, where 
“reasonable suspicion exist[ed] that the person” was an unlawful 
undocumented alien,319 or there was “probable cause to believe” that the 
person had committed an offense that made that person “removable” from 
the United States.320  It also created a cause of action allowing “people to 
sue local government or agencies if they believe[d] federal or state 
immigration law [was] not being enforced.”321  Finally, the law carefully 
delineates that immigration status is defined and verified using federal 
standards.322   
The law was supposed to become effective on July, 29, 2010, but it 
occasioned immediate international, popular, legislative, and legal 
backlash.323  Among the most vocal critics were Latino groups and 
legislators, who were concerned about the law’s use as an ethnic or racial 
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profiling tool.324  Although the law stated that its implementation had to be 
consistent with federal immigration and civil rights laws,325 critics were 
concerned that the law would create fear and distrust of Latinos in Arizona, 
as well as have “nationwide repercussions.”326  Overall, S.B. 1070’s 
comprehensive scope unnerved various constituencies and caused Arizona 
both economic and reputational harm.327 
Importantly, S.B. 1070 was so controversial that it put pressure on the 
federal government and reinvigorated the immigration debate at the federal 
level.328  On July 6, 2010, the Justice Department filed suit against the State 
of Arizona, challenging S.B. 1070’s constitutionality.329  Despite the 
controversy, Arizona refused to capitulate to the increasing pressure to 
revoke the law and defended it.330  The Justice Department presented its 
position on July 22, 2010, argued that the Arizona law was preempted by 
federal law, and urged Judge Susan R. Bolton to grant a preliminary 
injunction before the law became effective on July 29, 2010.331  Judge 
Bolton expressed skepticism about the federal government’s constitutional 
challenge and continually asked the federal government to explain how the 
Arizona law infringed federal authority to remove immigrants.332 
On July 28, 2010, the day before S.B. 1070 was to become effective, 
Judge Bolton handed down her decision, which struck the most 
controversial provisions and let the remaining provisions go into effect.333  
Accordingly, the provision empowering the police to detain people where a 
reasonable suspicion existed that they were in Arizona in violation of U.S 
immigration laws was enjoined.334  Also enjoined were the provisions 
requiring police officers to check a person’s immigration status during 
routine stops for traffic violations and foreigners to carry identification 
documents proving they were legally present in the country.335  However, 
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the provisions criminalizing the harboring and transporting of 
undocumented persons, and allowing people to sue local governments 
where they believe federal immigration law is not being enforced survived 
the district court’s review.336  
Judge Bolton’s decision was welcomed by immigrant rights’ groups, 
which were particularly concerned with the potential for racial profiling 
abuse.337  However, supporters of the Arizona law and the state’s right to 
enact such legislation expressed anger and dismay at the decision and its 
implications for states’ ability to allocate limited resources.338  The 
governor of Arizona vowed to appeal the decision and observers cautioned 
that the delicately carved decision was just a preliminary injunction and 
could be overturned.339  By the time of the ruling, the uncertainty and 
controversy around S.B. 1070 had already forced many immigrant families 
to self-deport or move to other states.340 
C. Scholarship Models to Federal Preemption in the Immigration Context 
There are three scholarship models to analyze the relationship between 
the state and local government vis-à-vis the federal government.  These 
three models are useful to study Lozano and Chicanos Por La Causa, and to 
understand the balance struck by the courts through a preemption lens.  The 
models are federal exclusivity, state and local regulation of immigration, 
and cooperative federalism.341  Part II.C will analyze each scholarship 
model to determine how each fits under or would alter the current 
immigration scheme. 
1. Federal Exclusivity 
The federal exclusivity model reflects the foundational cases’ approach.  
It deposits plenary power over immigration regulation exclusively in the 
federal government.342  It prevents both states and localities from passing 
laws that affect immigration in its broad definition.343  Accordingly, 
subfederal governments cannot enact negative or positive laws regulating 
noncitizens.  The Lozano decision illustrates this approach. 
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The Supreme Court has continuously determined that when the federal 
government has plenary power in any particular area, Congress cannot 
divest itself of this authority.344  The delegation of plenary power violates 
the constitutional text and structure.345  When congressional plenary power 
is grounded in the constitutional text, the states and localities do not have a 
role to play and Congress cannot grant them power to act in the area—the 
power is non-devolvable.346  The basis for the non-devolution principle in 
the immigration context is grounded in other areas of law.347 
Advocates of this approach prefer it because of the inextricability of 
immigration and foreign relations in an increasingly interconnected 
world.348  The reasoning is that if states are permitted to regulate in this 
area, even if based on their police powers, the disparate state policies could 
potentially embroil the country in problems with other nations.349  Even 
though foreign nations recognize that the states are not distinct entities from 
the United States, the fact is that states have increased their interactions 
with other countries.350  Although this theory is strongest when dealing with 
“serious international players like California, Texas, and New York,”351 it 
remains an attractive rationale.352 
Additionally, the federal government does not remove every 
undocumented alien who is in the country in violation of the immigration 
laws.353  The state and local laws about employment or housing of 
undocumented aliens redistribute immigrant flows to other states and 
localities354 or precipitate self-deportation.355  Federal exclusivity advocates 
argue that the subnational laws also conflict with the federal policy of 
nonenforcement with respect to the removal of unauthorized aliens.356 
Proponents of this approach argue that states and localities should stay 
out of the immigration scheme.357  They contend that states and localities 
are incapable of considering the effects of their law beyond their 
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jurisdictional limits.358  As such, “[a] sudden extirpation of some twelve 
million foreign nationals would not go unnoticed by our neighbors.”359  
Allowing state and local governments to continue passing immigration-
related laws could lead to incongruent policies, which in turn could lead to 
massive self-deportations or relocations of immigrants to other states and 
cause tension with other countries or sister states.360 
Federal exclusivity advocates also point to existing federal immigration 
law and argue it reflects a “comprehensive scheme,”361 which ousts the 
states from the field.  They point to the federal government’s regulation of 
the immigration area through criminal, employment, and welfare provisions 
to support the existence of an all-encompassing federal immigration system 
that displaces state and local involvement.362  Within this approach, any 
role the state or local governments may play can occur only at the behest of 
the federal government.363 
2. State and Local Regulation of Immigration 
A true state-local approach to immigration is not possible due to the 
Supreme Court’s declaration of federal plenary power in the field.364  
Accordingly, in discussing this scholarship model, the current immigration 
scheme will serve as the example.  Despite the Supreme Court’s declaration 
of federal plenary power in immigration policy, legislative developments in 
the last thirty years established a role for subfederal governments within the 
current regulatory scheme.365  The current immigration scheme encourages 
states and localities to fill in the gaps where the federal government has 
failed to act and where the states have not been explicitly displaced.366  
Nevertheless, for states and localities to pass immigration-related legislation 
based on their police powers367 requires manipulative technical skill to 
avoid federal preemption.368 
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rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, slip op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010) (citing Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)); McKanders, supra note 81, at 596. 
 362. McKanders, supra note 81, at 596 (“[T]he Lozano court correctly and broadly 
interpreted Congress’s power to regulate immigration. [It] found that Congress, under [the] 
IRCA, had created a comprehensive scheme . . . .”). 
 363. Cf. Englund, supra note 160, at 903–10. 
 364. See supra notes 55–74 and accompanying text. 
 365. Bartlett, supra note 147, at 1021–22 (discussing the introduction of CLEAR Act, 
which “reaffirms states and cities inherent police powers to enforce immigration laws and 
protect its citizens”); Kobach, supra note 189, at 1327–28; McKanders, supra note 147, at 
14–20.  “[M]ost interesting about the Clear Act of 2007 is that the bill clearly states that the 
inherent police powers of states and municipalities has never been displaced or preempted by 
Congress in the field of immigration enforcement.” Bartlett, supra note 147, at 1022. 
 366. Kobach, supra note 85, at 483; McKanders, supra note 147, at 14–20. 
 367. McKanders, supra note 147, at 22 (“States have traditionally used their Tenth 
Amendment police powers to exercise control over immigrants within their communities.” 
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Different states and cities are exposed to varying levels of immigration 
and thus to varying costs of absorbing immigrants, both legal and 
undocumented, into their fabrics.369  As such, some states and localities 
become “sanctuaries,”370 while others use “attrition by enforcement” 
strategies and become synonymous with anti-immigrant legislation.371 
It is the attrition by enforcement method that is at the fore of the 
debate.372  States and localities that have succeeded in upholding laws that 
punish the hiring and harboring of undocumented aliens by deferring to 
federal standards claim the laws were necessary to conserve finite 
resources.373  Commentators urge that the laws are not prohibited 
regulations of immigration, but rather are about state and local 
governments’ decisions on how to allocate limited resources to address the 
increased costs or obligations of immigration influxes.374 
 
3. Cooperative Federalism 
Various scholars have criticized the courts’ applications of preemption 
analyses.375  These scholars argue that the application of broad preemption 
analyses limits “federalism’s iterative opportunities”376 and expands 
presidential and congressional power at the expense of local democratic 
forces.377  They posit that the lens through which the courts analyze 
preemption and federalism has not kept up with the changed federal 
 
(citing Laurel R. Boatright, “Clear Eye for the State Guy”:  Clarifying Authority and 
Trusting Federalism To Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1666 (2006))). 
 368. The City of Hazleton implied that because it had followed federal standards with 
“exacting precision,” its ordinance eschewed federal preemption because it only took actions 
permitted by Congress. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 519 (M.D. Pa. 
2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, slip op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010) 
(quoting Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss at 37, Lozano 
v. City of Hazleton, 496 F.Supp.2d 477 (2007) (No. 3:06–cv–01586–JMM)); Kobach, supra 
note 85, at 464 (“[S]tate statutes must be carefully drafted to avoid federal preemption.”). 
 369. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 586 n.72, 637. 
 370. Id. at 600–05. 
 371. See generally Kobach, supra note 303 (explaining how this enforcement strategy has 
yielded results in driving out the undocumented in Arizona and Missouri). 
 372. See supra note 315. 
 373. Kobach, supra note 189, at 1324–25; Kobach, supra note 85, at 459–62.  “In city 
after city, and state after state, governments have acted for one overriding reason:  they can’t 
afford not to.” Kobach, supra note 189, at 1324. 
 374. Kobach, supra note 189, at 1324–25; Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local 
Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25, 1632–41 (2008) (“[L]ocal 
involvement in immigration regulations is not always solely or even primarily concerned 
about immigration per se, but [is] an attempt to circumvent or negotiate obligations and 
constraints that have been imposed by state law.”). 
 375. Gulasekaram, supra note 4, at 1481; Resnik, supra note 120, at 41–42; Rodríguez, 
supra note 2, at 609–30. 
 376. Resnik, supra note 120, at 41. 
 377. Id. at 73. 
358 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
landscape and stifles local legislative innovation.378  For example, state and 
local governments and their officials are increasingly interrelated in the 
twentieth century.379  This increased interconnection is illustrated by 
governmental interest groups, which lobby for subnational actors’ interests 
and to protect them from national encroachments.380  States and localities 
also are more international and, through interest group memberships, adopt 
foreign issues into domestic law—usually, where the federal government 
has failed to act.381 
The cooperative federalism model proposed by Professor Cristina M. 
Rodríguez suggests that a “reformulation of existing federalism 
presumptions in the immigration context” is needed to better address 
federal and subfederal concerns.382  The model calls for courts to limit their 
preemption analyses to that applied in all other contexts.383  Accordingly, 
courts should abandon “strong field and obstacle preemption theories in 
immigration cases.”384  Professor Rodríguez’s proposed framework 
improves the status quo and offers subfederal governments meaningful 
participation within the immigration regulatory scheme.385  Real 
participation and empowerment of subfederal entities can “restrain [court] 
impulses to preempt legislation . . . [and] create incentives for cooperative 
ventures in immigration regulation.”386 
Considering congressional inability to enact lasting and effective 
comprehensive immigration reform, cooperative federalism becomes an 
important model to reinforce, revamp, and implement durable immigration 
laws.387  Because states and localities absorb immigrants and must cope 
with increased resource consumption and other immigration-related effects, 
it is important to give them a voice in immigration regulation as “agents of 
integration.”388  Thus, Rodríguez suggests, reassessing the foundational 
basis for the current ambiguous federal exclusivity system, without 
overemphasizing the national interest in immigration regulation, can foster 
 
 378. See id. at 42–43, 65; see also Gulasekaram, supra note 4, at 1450 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s thick notion of national sovereign power is anachronistic.”). 
 379. Resnik, supra note 120, at 45. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. at 46–47.  For example, because many local officials disagreed with the federal 
government’s failure to adopt the Kyoto Protocol, some cities enacted ordinances to conform 
to the Protocol’s targets. Id. at 62. 
 382. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 567. 
 383. Id. at 567–68. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. at 568, 572. 
 386. Id. at 568. 
 387. See id. 
 388. Id. at 571, 581.   
States and localities must determine how to integrate immigrants, legal and illegal 
alike, into the body politic. . . . [Therefore,] immigration regulation should be 
included in the list of quintessentially state interests, such as education, crime 
control, and the regulation of health, safety, and welfare, not just because 
immigration affects each of those interests, but also because managing immigrant 
movement is itself a state interest. 
Id. at 571. 
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federal-state-local cooperation and strengthen the federal and subfederal 
relationship to manage migration efficiently.389 
Under this model, both the courts and Congress would have to modify 
their conduct with regards to immigration regulation.  Courts would adhere 
to the default rule under preemption doctrine, which is one of concurrent 
subject matter jurisdiction.390  In the absence of an actual conflict and not 
just “on general assertions of the risk of potential harms,” the courts should 
not displace state legislation that relates to federal legislation.391  Because 
the Constitution does not explicitly delegate immigration authority to the 
federal or state governments, the proper allocation of immigration authority 
between levels of government is a political judgment for which the courts 
are not the best proxies to strike the proper balance.392  The courts’ current 
approach to this area—through broad preemption analysis—is unlikely to 
provide a permanent fix that addresses both the states’ and the federal 
concerns in the immigration field.393  “[E]ven if the courts find some 
particular measures unconstitutional,” the need for both state and federal 
action in the area is unlikely to go away.394  Accordingly, along with a 
strong presumption against preemption, part of the proposal for cooperative 
federalism calls for courts to consider whether a state or local law is a 
regulation or a selection rule.395  Although the difference between 
regulation and selection rules is not clear cut, the distinction is helpful to 
advance the national discussion and balance national and subnational 
interests.396 
States could provide meaningful involvement in selection rules by 
serving as laboratories of innovation to tighten the immigration regulation 
scheme.397  Therefore, when the courts and Congress are determining what 
state and local actions to preempt in the immigration context, they should 
consider the conceptual difference between regulation and selection.398  
 
 389. Id. at 573.  Professor Cristina M. Rodríguez believes cooperative federalism will 
“reshape our conceptual and doctrinal understandings of immigration regulation” by 
“restraining Congress from explicitly preempting much [subfederal] legislation that may 
seem counter to federal objectives at first glance.” Id. at 571, 573.  Through the integration 
of both federal and state-local concerns into the immigration regulatory scheme, Congress 
would be restrained from “over-regulating with respect to integration issues, such as the 
rights and benefits states can accord immigrants within their jurisdictions.” Id. at 573. 
 390. Resnik, supra note 120, at 75; see supra notes 127–44. 
 391. Resnik, supra note 120, at 75–76. 
 392. Clare Huntington, A House Still Divided, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 227, 231–
32 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/response.php?rid=63. 
 393. Id. at 232. 
 394. Id. 
 395. See generally id. 
 396. Id. at 232–33. 
 397. See id. at 233. 
 398. Id.; Resnik, supra note 120, at 85–86 (using the Sudan context to illustrate how local 
efforts eventually affect national political postures).  The history of California’s Proposition 
187, which prohibited most types of public benefits for undocumented immigrants, stands as 
an early state effort to curb undocumented immigration to California. LEGOMSKY & 
RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1283.  The passage of Proposition 187 led to immediate 
lawsuits to enjoin its enforcement. Id. at 1284.  Nevertheless, the national controversy and 
inflamed passions engendered by the California law may have added clarity to the 
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Under this system, “subnational governments cannot choose which 
noncitizens can come into the state, but a state can choose the conditions 
under which noncitizens live.  This balance preserves the idea that the 
federal government chooses its members and state and local governments 
make decisions about their resources.”399  Because each state and locality 
experiences the costs of undocumented immigrants to varying degrees, the 
regulation and selection distinction can allay fears and empower 
subnational governments’ resource allocation decisions. 
Finally, this model would require modification of current congressional 
practices.  For a proper and clear preemption analysis, Congress would need 
to make explicit how or if state and local action is displaced by specific 
federal legislation in the immigration context.400  For this preemption 
clarity to exist, the courts would have to apply a “normalized” preemption 
analysis and presume against the displacement of subnational laws that 
overlap with the federal immigration scheme.  Insisting on clear 
congressional directives before finding preemption can push Congress to 
balance the allocation of authority among federal-state-local governments, 
so that both state-local and national interests are reflected.401  Some courts’ 
current approaches not only expand presidential and congressional 
power,402 but also broaden the courts’ own roles to determine “when 
national interests require preemption of state and local legislation.”403  The 
current divergent approaches to preemption analysis illustrate that courts 
have become de facto policy makers in the immigration context.  Thus, 
judicial restraint is required to incentivize prompt congressional action and 
avoid the solidification of the ground for or the proliferation of brown 
sundown towns. 
 
immigration debate, when Congress responded with the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and IIRIRA in 1996. Cf. id.  The 
relevant provisions that solved the issue stated that unauthorized aliens were not eligible for 
any “[s]tate or local public benefit,” except for certain emergency relief programs. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1621(a)–(c) (2006).  As such, the federal government enacted the legislation that 
California sought to implement and unauthorized aliens were excluded from “any retirement, 
welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food 
assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit,” grants, contracts, and 
licenses provided by an agency of a state or local government. Id. § 1621 (c)(1)(B). 
 399. Huntington, supra note 392, at 233.  For example, LAWA can be explained as both a 
regulation and selection rule because it sanctions employers who hire undocumented 
immigrants. Id. at 232–33 (“It operates as a regulation rule by making it more difficult for 
unauthorized migrants in Arizona to find employment. But it also operates as a selection rule 
because it likely influences the decision whether to come to the United States, or at least to 
Arizona.”).  However, by applying the conceptual distinction, such a law should not be 
preempted because the selection distinction does not create an actual conflict and Arizona is 
not making the selection determination. 
 400. See Resnik, supra note 120, at 76. 
 401. See Huntington, supra note 392, at 232–34; Resnik, supra note 120, at 75–76. 
 402. See Resnik, supra note 120, at 76–77. 
 403. Id. at 84; cf. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 523–24 (M.D. Pa. 
2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, slip op. at 146 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010); supra 
notes 230–39 and accompanying text. 
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III. PAVING THE WAY FOR COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND AVOIDING 
BROWN SUNDOWN TOWNS 
This part proposes that the cooperative federalism model is the most 
effective model to balance federal and state-local concerns and tighten the 
immigration regulatory scheme.  It also posits that the Ninth Circuit’s 
preemption analysis is the best approach to move the current federal 
regulatory system towards cooperative federalism.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
preemption analysis approach and the cooperative federalism model 
represent the most adequate and efficient methods to provide a 
meaningfully functional and lasting immigration regulatory scheme.  Part 
III.C considers how the Ninth Circuit’s approach is important to galvanize 
the federal government towards the cooperative federalism model and help 
to curtail the emergence of or the expansion of brown sundown towns. 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Chicanos Por La Causa Decision Illustrates the 
Appropriate Approach to Preemption Analysis in the Immigration Context 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision adhered to De Canas’ 
regulation and selection distinction to balance Arizona’s interests within the 
current federally-oriented system.404  In analyzing LAWA for federal 
preemption, the court applied a normalized examination for express, field, 
and conflict preemption.405  LAWA mirrored federal standards to determine 
immigration status and fell within IRCA’s savings clause, thus express 
preemption was not applicable.406  LAWA is a licensing law through which 
Arizona regulates employment in the state—a function that falls under its 
police powers.407 
With regard to implied field preemption, similar reasoning for the 
express preemption argument is applicable.408  If Congress had intended to 
fully occupy the entire field of employment immigration regulations, the 
savings clause would have been omitted.  Conflict preemption also was 
inappropriate to invalidate the law because although Arizona struck a 
different balance from the federal government, the case arose as a facial 
challenge.409  The law had yet to be enforced, so any conflicts or problems 
 
 404. See supra notes 80–84, 146–58, 187 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 
395–400 and accompanying text. 
 405. See supra notes 125–58, 180–87, 280–91 and accompanying text. 
 406. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95; supra notes 171–78, 280–88 and 
accompanying text. 
 407. See supra text accompanying notes 56–58, 140, 157–59, 269–75, 285–88; supra Part 
I.E. 
 408. See supra text accompanying notes 280–91. 
 409. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2008), 
amended by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. 
Candelaria, ____ S. Ct. ____, 78 U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115); see 
supra text accompanying notes 283–288.  The federal government does not deport all 
unauthorized immigrants, not because it has chosen not to enforce the law, but because it 
lacks human and financial resources, and must prioritize its focus to deport dangerous aliens, 
both documented and undocumented. Cf. Kobach, supra note 303, at 157-58, 162-63. 
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were unsubstantiated.  The court warned that, should similar litigation arise 
in an enforcement context, the fact-finding may lead to a different result.410 
It is precisely this sort of nuanced and restrained preemption analysis that 
courts should adhere to in the context of state and local regulations that 
affect immigrants.411  This approach allows the legislative process and 
immigration dialogue to take hold at the state and local level.412  It reflects 
the reality on the ground that it is states and localities that must 
accommodate immigrants, both legal and undocumented, into their 
fabrics.413  Thus, subnational governments should be able to make 
legislative decisions on how to allocate finite resources.  The federal 
government is less sensitive to these concerns because it benefits from the 
taxes paid by undocumented persons.414  Burdened states and localities may 
have behaved differently if the federal government had shared some of 
those revenues with them. 
Independent of other motives precipitating the state of Arizona to enact 
LAWA and S.B. 1070, Chicanos Por La Causa’s aftermath demonstrates 
that allowing the polity to determine its priorities may have beneficial, 
albeit limited, effects.415  The immigrant exodus in the months leading up to 
and subsequent to the passage of the legislation indicates that it provided 
enough of a deterrent to lessen the influx and presence of unauthorized 
immigrants in Arizona.416  While hate crimes against Latinos have risen in 
the state, the trend mirrors a national increase that is likely attributable to 
the heated immigration debate at the national level.417  Even though the 
anti-immigrant and inflammatory language continues to plague LAWA, 
287(g) enforcement, and the S.B. 1070 controversy in the state,418 no 
increase in or egregious occurrences of violent crime by locals against 
immigrants has been widely reported.419  It is too soon to determine 
 
 410. See Chicanos Por La Causa, 544 F.3d at 981. 
 411. See supra text accompanying notes 376–78, 383–86. 
 412. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 259 (“In the immigration cases . . . the Court has relied 
on the plenary power doctrine to avoid performing any balancing of the relevant 
countervailing interests.”); cf. id. at 263–68 (stating that courts should apply normal 
standards of review, except when foreign policy or other important aliens’ rights are 
realistically threatened). 
 413. See supra notes 7–11, 388–89 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying 
note 369; cf. Morse, supra note 190, at 519–20 (“[I]t is the system that needs to change to 
reflect reality, as opposed to the issue being the need to better enforce the existing laws.”). 
 414. Gulasekaram, supra note 4, at 1472, 1481. 
 415. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 595–97, 635–37. 
 416. See supra notes 298–306 and accompanying text; see also Jordan, supra note 333, at 
A6 (stating that S.B. 1070 prompted many undocumented immigrants to move to other states 
or back to their countries) . 
 417. See supra text accompanying notes 307–09. 
 418. See supra text accompanying notes 310–12. 
 419. Zachary Roth, More Far-Right Violence? Anti-Immigrant Suspects in Arizona 
Killing Have Ties To White Supremacists, TPMMUCKRAKER (June 16, 2009 12:48 EST), 
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/06/more_rightwing_violence_anti–
immigrant_suspects_in_1.php.  Although the violent murder of a Mexican immigrant and his 
young daughter in an Arizona border town were reported, the homicide was the product of 
white supremacist group leader with no particular links to Arizona. Id.  One of the suspects, 
Shawna Forde, is linked to various murders throughout the country associated with white 
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whether the S.B. 1070 mixed decision will increase violence against 
immigrants in Arizona, but certain political commentators warned of 
growing anger and resentment. 420   
The Supreme Court asked President Barack Obama’s administration to 
weigh in on the Arizona law challenge pending before the Court before it 
decided to grant or deny certiorari.421  On June 28, 2010, the Court granted 
certiorari.422  The Supreme Court should follow the Ninth Circuit’s narrow 
preemption analysis.   
The narrow approach gives the statutory language in IRCA’s savings 
clause its natural meaning, respects the states’ police powers in the 
employment context, and demonstrates judicial restraint in making policy 
judgments.  Significantly, the narrow approach signals to Congress that 
immigration reform is overdue and that the states should be integral parts of 
the new regulatory scheme.  For durable immigration reform, states must 
play meaningful roles in enforcement to help control unauthorized 
immigration and reduce the incentives and opportunities for unauthorized 
immigrants to live in the shadows.423  The states and localities are the ones 
that must accommodate immigrants, both legal and undocumented, and the 
federal government does not have the resources to deport all unauthorized 
immigrants.  This is precisely why the subnational governments must be 
involved in the immigration enforcement scheme.  Otherwise, the stop-
valve approach exemplified in the previous waves of legalization programs 
will continue to attract unauthorized immigrants hoping to go undetected 
long enough to benefit from the next mass legalization scheme. 
Additionally, the fact that Congress has not acted to overturn the Ninth 
Circuit decision is key.424  Rather, as exemplified recently in CLEAR 
Act,425 it appears that Congress has embraced the erosion of federal 
exclusivity.426  IRCA, IIRIRA, PRWORA, and CLEAR Act, all 
contemplate or carve out spaces to allow states and localities a role to play 
within the immigration context.427  Because CLEAR Act is the most recent 
 
supremacist causes. Id.  Reportedly, the murder victim was a known drug dealer and the 
suspects expected to find weapons and money to fund their cause. Id.  Despite being 
motivated by animus towards immigrants, there were other motivating factors. Id.  Thus, this 
murder is distinguishable from violent crime committed by locals of cities or states where 
immigrant-related laws were found to be preempted.  However, the S.B. 1070’s potential for 
racial and ethnic profiling was a different but still concerning issue. See Archibold, supra 
note 323. 
 420. See Weisman & Simon, supra note 338, at A6. 
 421. Daniel González & Dan Nowicki, Justices May Hear Disputed Ariz. Law, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 2009, at A1. 
 422. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), amended 
by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. 
Candelaria, ____ S. Ct. ____, 78 U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115). 
 423. Cf. Lacey, supra note 323 (discussing how migrants perceive Arizona’s laws and 
how migrants will continue to come to Arizona or other states as long as there are jobs for 
them across the border). 
 424. See supra text accompanying notes 114–18, 305–06. 
 425. See supra text accompanying notes 114–18. 
 426. See supra Part I.C. 
 427. See supra Part I.C. 
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development in the immigration debate, its language should inform courts’ 
preemption analyses.  The proposed statutory language explicitly states that 
concurrent subfederal authority in the enforcement of immigration law is 
neither expressly nor impliedly displaced.428  It indicates that “the Lozano 
court’s field preemption analysis is flawed”429 and that the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach is better aligned with congressional intent. 
B.  Cooperative Federalism Is the Most Effective Model for the Federal and 
State-Local Relationship as Reflected in Chicanos Por La Causa 
The cooperative federalism model attempts to move the immigration 
regulation scheme “[t]oward a [n]ew [p]ower-[s]haring [t]heory.”430  The 
evolution from federal legislation, as exhibited in IRCA, IIRIRA, the 
PRWORA, and CLEAR Act, to increased state and local participation, 
demonstrates that federal exclusivity is no longer a viable theory in the 
immigration context.431 
The status quo reflects deference to the federal exclusivity doctrine, 
which is exhibited in the broad preemption analyses used to evaluate state-
local legislation affecting immigrants.432  Such broad analyses emphasize 
federal concerns and increase anti-immigrant sentiment as state-local 
governments are disempowered and their resource allocation concerns, 
whether real or not, are disregarded.433  The brewing hostility against and 
suspicion of immigrants will result in their exodus and create a breeding 
ground of resentment similar to the one that produced the first sundown 
towns.434  The events in Hazleton and nearby cities demonstrate that the 
path towards brown sundown towns may have been paved already.435  The 
murder of Luis Ramirez by local teenagers, the increased proliferation of 
similar ordinances, and the inflammatory rhetoric have bred fear and 
resulted in an exodus of both legal and undocumented immigrants.436 
The current state and local attrition by enforcement approaches likely fall 
within the states’ and localities’ police powers.437  However, they require 
legal technical maneuvers to avoid federal preemption.438  The legality of 
the measures does not negate the inappropriate motives against immigrants 
 
 428. See supra text accompanying notes 114–18. 
 429. Bartlett, supra note 147, at 1022. 
 430. Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 617. 
 431. See supra text accompanying note 427; supra notes 119–24, 378–89 and 
accompanying text. 
 432. See supra notes 83, 84, 159–62, 225–39, 390–96 and accompanying text. 
 433. See supra text accompanying notes 386–89; see also Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 
595–96, 639.  “[P]reempting local laws that aim to exclude immigrants will not make for a 
better integration environment, because the sentiments behind the preempted ordinances are 
likely to remain and fester.” Id. at 639. 
 434. Compare Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 595–96, 639 (discussing the importance of 
narrow preemption analyses and tolerance for disharmony and short-term backlash), with 
Part I.A (illustrating the history of sundown towns and the exodus of various ethnic groups). 
 435. See supra notes 241–52 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 245–52 and accompanying text. 
 437. See Kobach, supra note 85; see also supra notes 373–74 and accompanying text. 
 438. See supra notes 366–68 and accompanying text. 
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that may have driven such campaigns.  Although the approach can move the 
immigration debate to the forefront through increased media and judicial 
scrutiny,439 it is not a permanent solution.  Attrition through enforcement is 
a springboard to rethink and evolve the status quo—embodied in broad 
preemption analyses—towards cooperative federalism, which best balances 
the concerns driving the two divergent approaches. 
The cooperative federalism model empowers state and local governments 
to determine how to manage immigrant influxes within their resource 
allocation and police powers.440  Because the model envisions a role for 
both the national and subnational governments, it can better protect 
immigrants’ rights from improper legislative motives.441  It can also help to 
quell the inflamed passions that the immigration debate provokes at both 
the federal and subnational levels.442  State and local legislation that affects 
immigrants probably will adversely affect undocumented immigrants by 
forcing them into other states and localities.443  However, with respect to 
those immigrants that remain, the cast of suspicion and communal hostility 
will dissipate because the presumption will be that they are lawfully in the 
United States. 
The move towards a cooperative federalism model may result in a 
patchwork of immigration legislation.  Different states can take sanctuary-
like or enforcement-focused approaches as they determine the allocation of 
limited resources.444  Nevertheless, the interim patchy immigration picture 
probably will catalyze the re-creation of the immigration scheme.445  The 
divergent approaches can create competition and innovation to incentivize 
or force the federal government either to:  (1) adopt the cooperative 
federalism model, or (2) set out clearer policies and standards to allow the 
courts to determine what actually constitutes immigration regulation.446 
California’s Proposition 187 is an example of what the transition to 
cooperative federalism could look like.447  The state’s attempt to exclude 
undocumented aliens from most public benefits, even constitutionally 
protected ones,448 produced immediate lawsuits to enjoin its 
enforcement.449  While animus towards Latinos may have been a driving 
 
 439. See supra notes 299–306 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 403–25. 
 440. See supra Part I.E; supra notes 388, 399 and accompanying text; see also Rodríguez, 
supra note 2, at 571, 581–82. 
 441. See supra note 412 and accompanying text. 
 442. See Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 639. 
 443. Id.; see also McFeely, supra note 299 (“‘What was Oklahoma’s problem is now 
some other state’s problem.’” (quoting Oklahoma Representative Randy Terrill on the 
success of the Oklahoma law that makes it illegal to harbor an undocumented person)). 
 444. See Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 581–609; supra Parts II.A.1–2. 
 445. See Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 638–40; supra note 9; infra text accompanying note 
449. 
 446. See supra text accompanying note 158; supra notes 390–403 and accompanying 
text. 
 447. See supra note 398; see also Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 595–96. 
 448. See supra notes 109, 398 and accompanying text. 
 449. See supra note 398 and accompanying text. 
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force behind the passage of the legislation, it propelled the legislation to the 
national stage.450  The controversy likely precipitated congressional action 
in the form of PRWORA and IIRIRA.451  This legislative exchange 
between the subnational and national levels demonstrates that partnership 
creates a legislative dialogue, which, in turn, moves the federal government 
to act—to clarify its policies and to address the subnational concerns. 
Two years elapsed from Proposition 187’s passage at the state level in 
1994 to the federal overhaul embodied in PRWORA and IIRIRA in 
1996.452  Two years can be a long time to tolerate anti-immigrant rhetoric 
and animus, and the conditions for brown sundown towns may be solidified 
in the meantime.  However, because sanctuary states and cities will 
continue to exist in the interim, at a minimum, undocumented aliens have 
some options.  Given that the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
comprehensive immigration reform is back on the legislative horizon, the 
answer to the proper relationship between the federal and state-local level 
with respect to the immigration regulatory scheme may emerge in less than 
two years.  Courts should let the issue percolate instead of stepping in as 
policy makers in overlapping areas where, historically, they have been 
reluctant to supplant their political judgment for that of the political 
branches—be that Congress in the immigration context or the states and 
localities in resource allocation and traditional police powers. 
C. Avoiding Brown Sundown Towns 
The Lozano court’s decision, while admirable for emphasizing 
immigrants’ substantive rights,453 was a disservice to the immigration 
reform debate.  While the Hazleton ordinance was overly broad and some 
of its language was problematic, certain provisions mirrored LAWA and 
should have survived.454  The court’s broad preemption approach allowed it 
to engage in an unusual, labored, and results-oriented reasoning process.455  
Such a broad approach set the Hazleton ordinance up to be preempted, so 
much so that the court’s decision in the case prohibited the City from fixing 
the ordinance.  Thus, even though the local ordinance had other problems, 
the court mistakenly determined that Hazleton’s sanctioning scheme was 
not within IRCA’s savings provision.456 
Through its broad preemption analysis, the court quashed the debate at 
the local level.  The subsequent events in Hazleton illustrate what can 
happen when the polity is blocked from employing legal means to address 
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what it perceives to be communal problems.457  Sadly, the murder of Luis 
Ramirez, an undocumented immigrant, represents the extra-legal methods 
to excise the community of “problems.”458  The murder is likely to increase 
the outflow of immigrants from these cities.459  Thus, new brown sundown 
towns may emerge throughout states and cities that are denied the legal 
opportunity to determine how to allocate limited resources or how to 
accommodate population increases and demographic changes.  The broad 
preemption approach rewards the status quo and does not create a sense of 
urgency at the national level to address the reality that the immigration 
regulatory landscape has changed dramatically since 1893, when the 
Supreme Court announced federal exclusivity in the area.460 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s narrow preemption approach to LAWA 
can move the immigration debate forward.  The Arizona law was saved by 
the Ninth Circuit’s nuanced inquiry about both the federal and the state 
level interests, actual conflicts, and recognition of the iterative opportunities 
in the Arizona law.461  While the law still produced an exodus of 
undocumented immigrants and the rhetoric continues to be inflammatory, 
the incidence of violent communal crime towards undocumented aliens 
appears to be lower.462  Additionally, by allowing the Arizona law to stand, 
LAWA has been propelled to the national level, attracting the attention of 
the Supreme Court, the Obama Administration, and the Department of 
Homeland Security.463  LAWA also encouraged Arizona to pass S.B. 1070, 
which inflamed passions and catapulted the Department of Justice to act.464 
Finally, employment and public benefits regulations at the state and local 
levels are appropriate within the current regulatory scheme when they 
mirror federal standards.  However, they should also represent the outer 
limit of what is permissible at the subnational level during the transition 
from the status quo towards cooperative federalism.  Housing and harboring 
regulations, however, may be beyond state and local authority within the 
current immigration scheme.465  The lack of clarity in federal standards as 
to what constitutes harboring, as well as the invasiveness of the housing 
regulations, risk violating federal law and constitutional protections such as 
the Fair Housing Act and privacy rights, respectively.466  In the meantime, 
the public benefits and employment regulations at the state and local levels 
 
 457. See supra notes 19–28, 39–47, 241–52 and accompanying text. 
 458. See supra notes 19–28, 39–47, 188–94, 245–52 and accompanying text. 
 459. See supra text accompanying notes 243–44. 
 460. See supra notes 59–74 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 124. 
 461. See supra notes 283–91 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 376–78, 390–96. 
 462. See supra notes 307–12, 419 and accompanying text.  More statistical and empirical 
research may prove otherwise; however, the goal of this Note is to bring attention to the 
relation among preemption analysis, federal activity, and anti-immigrant sentiment to set the 
stage for a new explosion of sundown towns. 
 463. See supra text accompanying notes 421–24. 
 464. Supra Part II.B. 
 465. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. See generally Oliveri, supra note 221. 
 466. See supra note 234 and accompanying text; see also Oliveri, supra note 221, at  
81–97. 
368 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
address the same concerns that the housing and harboring prohibitions 
intend to solve.  Because there is more background, both in jurisprudence 
and statutes,467 to add precision to the employment and public benefits 
legislation, legislative use of such provisions for inappropriate purposes is 
more visible and thus, presumably, preventable. 
It is unclear whether S.B. 1070 or LAWA will survive Ninth Circuit and 
Supreme Court review.  However, increased harassment and profiling 
threats are creating sundown towns.  Nevertheless, the laws have also 
contributed to reopening the immigration debate and can pave the way for 
cooperative federalism.  Although a narrow preemption analysis may not 
completely eliminate the formation of sundown towns, it may have a 
positive effect in reducing ethnically-motivated violence.468 
State empowerment within a revamped immigration scheme is a key 
element to any comprehensive immigration reform.  Clearly defined federal 
limits are required to prevent ethnic and racial backlash that will convert 
American cities into brown sundown towns.  Recognition of the fiscal 
burdens that unfettered immigration can have on states and localities and 
the vital role these subnational entities play is crucial to tighten and create a 
durable federal immigration scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
The raging debate about comprehensive immigration reform is ripe 
ground to overhaul the current federally oriented scheme.  The divergent 
preemption approaches and scholarship models provide important 
background to inform the legislative process.  As exemplified by Lozano v. 
City of Hazleton, Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, and their 
aftermath, a narrow preemption approach is preferable to evaluate 
immigrant-related state-local legislation.  A narrow and complex approach 
better weighs state-local concerns and does not appear to increase anti-
immigrant violence.  It also generates notoriety at the federal level and 
incentivizes action.  Accordingly, courts and legislators should recognize 
the correlation between preemption, analytical clarity, and the practical 
reality at the state-local level—a reality that is a brewing ground for a new 
wave of sundown towns—brown sundown towns. 
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